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SBORNÍKvědeckých prací Vysoké školy báňské -

Technické univerzity OstravaŘada bezpečnostní inženýrství

TRANSACTIONSof the VŠB - Technical University

of Ostrava Safety Engineering Series

1 2013Volume VIII

Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava

TRANSACTIONSof the VŠB - Technical University

of Ostrava Safety Engineering Series

SBORNÍKvědeckých prací Vysoké školy báňské -

Technické univerzity OstravaŘada bezpečnostní inženýrství

1 2013Volume VIII

Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava

TRANSACTIONSof the VŠB - Technical University of OstravaSafety Engineering SeriesNumber 1, year 2013, Volume VIII

Publisher: VŠB - Technical University of OstravaPeriodicity: SemiannuallyLanguage of published articles: EnglishISSN 1801-1764 (printed version)ISSN 1805-3238 (on-line version)

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief:prof. Pavel Poledňák, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic

Deputy/Managing Editor:Assoc. prof. David Řehák, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic

Editorial Advisory Board:Assoc. prof. Aleš Bernatík, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republicprof. Aleš Dudáček, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech RepublicAssoc. prof. Zuzana Giertlová, Technische Universität München, GermanyAssoc. prof. Iveta Marková, Technical University in Zvolen, SlovakiaAssoc. prof. Imrich Mikolai, Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, SlovakiaAssoc. prof. Andrzej Mizerski, Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej, Polandprof. Leoš Navrátil, Czech Technical University in Prague, Czech RepublicAssoc. prof. Milos Nedved, Edith Cowan University, Australiaprof. Milan Oravec, Technical University in Košice, Slovakiaprof. Michael Rost, Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, GermanyDipl. Eng. Olivier Salvi, European Virtual Institute for Integrated Risk Management, Franceprof. Juraj Sinay, dr. h. c., Technical University in Košice, SlovakiaAssoc. Prof. Michail Šenovský, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republicprof. Vladimir Šimović, dr. h. c., University of Zagreb, Croatiaprof. Zdeněk Zemánek, University of Defence, Czech Republic

Technical Editor:Kateřina Sikorová, PhD, VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic

Current Issue Copy Deadline: 30. 6. 2013Each paper was reviewed by two reviewers.

Editorial Board:[email protected]

More information of the journal can be found on:http://www.fbi.vsb.cz/en/okruhy/veda-a-vyzkum/periodika/

Testing the Effect of Fullerene and its Derivatives on the EnvironmentVendula DRASTICHOVÁ, Ivana

BARTLOVÁ, Zuzana JANKOVSKÁ1 - 8

Quality Assessment of Activities Undertaken in the Area of Health and Safety Management Using the MERIT

Method - Case StudyZygmunt KORBAN

9 - 14

Analysis of the Powdered Material Produced by Processing of Different

Wood SamplesEva MRAČKOVÁ, Verica MILANKO,

Dušan GAVANSKI, Borislav SIMENDIĆ15 - 21

Calculation of Local Fire for Designing Building Structures

Jiří POKORNÝ, Petr KUČERA22 - 26

Phenomena Disturbing the Europe Security and Tasks for Future Research

Dana PROCHÁZKOVÁ27 - 34

Testing of Detection Characteristics of the Passive Infrared Motion Detectors

Andrej VEĽAS35 - 41

Analysis of Ground Transport Security of Emergency Medical Services in Deal

with Extraordinary EventsMiroslav TOMEK, Ľuboslava LAŠOVÁ

42 - 47

Content

Prologue

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Throughout their existence, people have been concerned with one of their basic needs, namely safety. We face safety problems in various forms every day. Safety is usually understood as the state in which peace and security of the state, democratic order and sovereignty of the state, territorial integrity and inviolability of state boundaries, fundamental rights and freedoms are preserved. And in which human life and health, property and the environment are protected. Safety engineering is a technical discipline that applies technical and scientifi c knowledge, uses laws of nature and natural and human means in order to identify hazards and to determine the level of risk; based on them, it deals with the creation of materials, buildings, machines, equipment, systems and processes that satisfy safety and functional criteria with regard to the economy, society and the environment.

One of conditions of fulfi lling the basic tasks of safety engineering is intercommunication among research and technical teams and publication of achieved results. A change in methodology for the evaluation of research work results places periodicals not registered in science databases at a disadvantage.

The Editorial Board is taking all necessary steps to achieve the inclusion of our Transactions in the Scopus database. In addition to administrative measures, what is decisive is a plenitude of well-researched articles. For this reason, we are approaching the broad professional and scientifi c communities about publishing the results of their work in Transactions of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Safety Engineering Series.

I believe that through joint efforts we can succeed in establishing the Transactions in the science database.I wish you a pleasant holiday.

Pavel PoledňákEditor-in-Chief

Transactions of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava

Safety Engineering Series

Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2013

1

TESTING THE EFFECT OF FULLERENE AND ITS DERIVATIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENTVendula DRASTICHOVÁ1, Ivana BARTLOVÁ2, Zuzana JANKOVSKÁ

1 VŠB - Technical university of Ostrava, Faculty of Safety Engineering, Ostrava, Czech Republic, [email protected] VŠB - Technical university of Ostrava, Faculty of Safety Engineering, Ostrava, Czech Republic, [email protected]

Abstract: The paper points to the increasing use of products containing nanomaterials and warns that the public which uses such products often fails to be adequately informed about their potential hazards. The specifi c subject of the paper is fullerene and its bromo derivative. The contradictory opinions regarding the hazards associated with this material are discussed, and its potential environmental impacts are investigated experimentally.

Keywords: Nanomaterials, Fullerene, Fullerene bromo derivative, Hazards, Risk.

Research article

IntroductionNanotechnology is a fi eld of science and

technology which uses the fi ndings and methods of many classical fi elds such as electronics, physics, quantum mechanics, chemistry and biochemistry. Nanomaterials are diverse, as are the areas of their application, and nowadays nanomaterials are used rather widely. Research in this area focuses on the structure of nanomaterials and their behaviour on the atomic scale. Interactions between microparticles and quantum phenomena are starting to play an important role in this.

Increased attention should be paid to the safety of the manufacture and use of nanomaterials. This fi eld has been advancing at such a fast pace that the hazardous properties of the materials so far could not be evaluated or adequate provisions adopted in the Czech Republic or in the European Union. Existing legislation applicable to nanoparticles is based on EU regulations and on laws covering chemical substances.

According to information presented in the communication "Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials" (Communication, 2008), any nanomaterial must meet the requirements of the REACH Regulation. Although the Regulation contains no paragraph devoted specifi cally to nanomaterials, they are included in the defi nition of a "substance". The main aim of REACH is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment from the risks that can be posed by chemicals (REACH Regulation, 2006). From the above it is clear that considerable attention should be paid to the potential hazards and risks to humans and the environment arising from nanomaterials.

The European Community Strategy for Health and Safety at Work has assigned several tasks, one of them being to identify health hazards associated with the use of new materials and processes (Skřehot and Rupová, 2009). Among new materials which are used in industrial processes are fullerene and its bromo derivative.

Fullerenes are giant molecules containing 20 or more carbon atoms in the apexes of polyhedra of spherical shape. A molecule of the most stable existing fullerene (Fig. 1) contains 60 carbon atoms and its diameter is about 1 nm. This is the most spherical and most symmetrical fullerene. All carbon atoms in the molecule are equivalent, which implies that strains are uniformly distributed throughout the structure. Its geometry is a truncated icosahedron, where 12 pentagons and 20 hexagons are so arranged that no two pentagons are neighbours (Barabaszová, 2006). This chemically best known fullerene is symbolized as C60.

Fig. 1 Fullerene with 60 carbon atoms (C60, 2004)

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Identifi ed fullerenes whose weight is greater than C60 include fullerenes C70, C76, CC78, C80, C82, and C84. The frequency of occurrence of fullerenes with more carbon atoms than 70 decreases. The C60 molecule exists in a single structure whereas higher fullerenes possess different structures in their molecules (Barabaszová, 2006).

Materials and methods

Natural occurrence and manufacture of fullerene

Fullerene has been identifi ed in space and in the cold atmospheres of meteorites. Fullerenes share 0.3 % to 0.9 % of interstellar carbon. Fullerenes exist on Earth as well. They are found in fulgurites (they emerge as a result of lightning striking soil, sand or solid rock, inducing remelting and vitrifi cation), in volcanic craters, in boundary sediments, in solid bitumens in the graphite deposit at Mílové (Blovice area), in bituminous coal seams in China, and the like. Fullerene deposits were identifi ed in the mineral called shungite, which is found in north-western Russia near the Finnish border (Karelia region) (Klouda and Kubátová, 2010). It is noteworthy that a new therapeutic and relaxation procedure based on the effects of natural shungite ("Shungite chamber") is used in the Czech Republic. The operator company maintains that fullerenes are benefi cial in the healing of infl ammations and during post-operative recovery, increasing the immunity of the human body.

The fi rst artifi cial fullerenes were prepared by laser ablation of a graphite target in a helium atmosphere following the method of H. W. Kroto. Fullerenes are marketed, e.g., by Frontier Carbon Corporation (FCC) seated in Tokyo, Japan. The process is based on the controlled combustion of organic substances. The outputs are in the order of tons per year, and the potential for substantial production volume increase exists, bringing about cost reductions. Other companies marketing this modifi cation of carbon include:• NANO-C, seated in Massachusetts, USA,

manufacturing fullerenes by effi cient combustion (see Fig. 2),

• NeoTechProduct, seated in St, Petersburg, Russia, manufacturing the product based on a Russian patent and on the ownership of a plasma arc reactor,

• Marchetti S.r.l., seated in Padua, Italy, manufacturing the product from graphite by a technology involving an electric arc.

Fig. 2 Fullerene obtained by combustion (Nano-C, 2001)

Reduction combined with addition is employed to improve or obtain the required properties of fullerenes. Reduction was the fi rst chemical conversion of fullerenes, enabling different properties to be imparted to fullerene derivatives. For example, an insulating material can be thus transformed into a superconductor. Addition reactions can give rise to various types of fullerene derivatives, sometimes with important photochemical properties.

Fullerene properties, safety data sheets and uses

A high hardness is the most remarkable property of fullerenes. The best-known type, hardened fullerene C60, is even superior to diamond in its hardness, thus being the hardest known material worldwide. Its density is only 0.3 % greater than the density of diamond. Young's modulus of elasticity expected for a fullerene crystal based on calculation is 15.9 GPa. The tensile strength of the nanotubes can reach a level as high as 63 GPa. Sound propagation velocity in fullerene is (2.1 to 4.3) x 105 cm.s-1 (Girman, 2009).

Chemical reactions of fullerenes are affected by their π-electrons, due to which they react like aliphatics rather than aromatics (Lhoták, 2004).

All the C60 carbons exhibit sp2 hybridization, their spatial arrangement, however is pyramidal (rather than planar). This brings about a large internal strain and so C60 fullerene is thermodynamically less stable than graphite (Lhoták, 2004). C60 is the thermodynamically most stable fullerene,

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presumably owing to its high symmetry - its shape approaches the sphere most of all among fullerenes. The molecule of fullerene C60 is appreciably electronegative, so it is easy to reduce but diffi cult to oxidize (Girman, 2009). Fullerenes transform into graphite at temperatures above 1 500 °C (Frank et. al., 2010).

Fullerenes doped with alkali metals can be used as superconductors. The highest superconductivity temperature is attained with the well-known Cs3C60. Fullerenes are well soluble in chloronaphthalene (51 mg.ml-1) and methylnaphthalene (33 mg.ml-1) and not so well soluble in toluene (3 mg.ml-1) and benzene (1.5 mg.ml-1). They are nearly insoluble (1.3 x 1011 mg.ml-1) in water (Girman, 2009).

As follows from the safety data sheets, fullerenes are irritants only.

Fullerene nanoparticles have been reported to form an insoluble fullerite with a hydrophobic surface in water (Zemanová and Klouda, 2011). On a water surface, fullerene forms toxic clusters as large as a few centimetres. C60 clusters may induce oxidative brain damage in fi sh. They penetrate into the fi sh brain, like into the mammalian brain, through the olfactory channel (Zemanová and Klouda, 2011). This information contradicts what is stated in the publication (Girman, 2009): “No toxic effects on humans have been identifi ed for fullerenes. No genotoxic or mutagenic potential of fullerenes has been identifi ed either.”

Hence, we are faced with the issue of the existence of two contradicting opinions regarding fullerene. Now, the question arises as to whether the benefi ts of nanomaterials outweigh their adverse impacts on humans and/or on the environment, or not.

The problem of the contradicting opinions may be resolved based on information contained in the safety data sheet, which is the basic document of any hazardous substance or mixture. A safety data sheet must contain identifi cation of the manufacturer or importer, information on the hazardous substance, and information needed to protect human health and the environment. It should enable individuals handling the substance/mixture to take health and environmental protection measures.

Among important data is the CAS number (Tab. 1), assigned by the Chemical Abstracts Service. This classifi cation defi nes fullerenes as clusters with even numbers of carbon atoms in a molecule, spatially arranged into a spherical or distorted spherical shape (Girman, 2009).

Tab. 1 CAS numbers of some fullerenes

From existing safety data sheets (Tab. 2, Tab. 3) it follows that fullerene is an irritant only. No toxicological or ecotoxicological information is available so far. Information on fullerene and its derivatives is insuffi cient and so we cannot consider one opinion more trustworthy than the other.

Fullerene C60 99.5 %

Tab. 2 Summary information extracted from the SDS of C60 (BL C60, 2010)

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Fullerene C60 99685-96-8Mixed fullerene C60/C70 131159-39-2Fullerene C70 115383-22-7Fullerene C76 135113-15-4Fullerene C78 136316-32-0Fullerene C84 135113-16-5

CAS No. 99685-96-8

Classifi cation according to CLP OKO Irrit. 2, STOT SE 3, H319, H 335.

Pictogram

H phrases H319 - Causes serious eye irritation.H335 - May cause respiratory irritation.

P phrases

P261 - Avoid breathing dust/fume/gas/mist/vapours/spray.P280 - Use protective gloves/protective clothes/safety glasses/face shield.P305+P351+P338 - IF IN EYES: Rinse continuously with water for several minutes. Remove contact lenses if present and easy to do. Continue rinsing.

Classifi cation according to DSD - Dangerous Substances Directive (Chemical Act)

Xi, R 36/37

SymbolXi

R phrases R 36/37/38 - Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin.

S phrases

S26 - In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek medical advice.S36 - Wear suitable protective clothing.

Physico-chemical properties

Appearance powder

Colour dark brown

Melting point > 280 °C

Flash point > 94 °C

Molecular weight 720.64 g.mol-1

Density 1.6 g.cm-3 at 20 °C

ADR/RID 4.1

Kemler code 40

UN code 1325




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Fullerene C70

Tab. 3 Summary information extracted from the SDS of C70 (BL C70, 2010)

A safety data sheet has also been developed for bromofullerene C60Br24, which is marketed by the MER Corporation seated in Arizona, USA. The manufacturer reports basic information on the compound only, no information on the physico-chemical properties, technical safety parameters or, most importantly, on the health risks is presented (Mer Corporation, 2005).

Manufacturers using fullerenes

The number of manufacturers that use fullerene is greater than one would expect in view of the lack of relevant information. The best-known manufacturers include, e.g., Millers Oils, UNT and YONEX.

Millers Oils - A-SHIFT s.r.o. launched a new generation of high performance gearbox oils (Millers Oils, 2009) for sports and racing applications using nanotechnology (CRX 75w140 NT and CRX LN 75w140 NT) in 2009. The additives are called inorganic fullerenes and are used to supersede additives used so far. When subjected to very high loads, the fullerenes are deformed into small rollers which reinforce the molecules of the oil. As a result, the load capacity of the oil increases, friction is reduced, the oil heats up less, and wear of mechanical parts is alleviated. Tests have demonstrated 25 % lower friction or even better when compared to oils with molybdenum disulfi de or PTFE (Millers Oils, 2009).

The manufacturer's safety data sheet does not indicate any serious hazard, only eye and skin irritation/reddening at the site of contact with the material. Nitrile gloves, protective goggles and protective clothing constitute the only PPE recommended, no respiratory protection being required.

As to the environmental hazard, the following combination of R phrases is given: R52/53 Harmful to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment. Synthetic oil should be absorbed by soil rapidly and should be biodegradable. The following S phrase is also presented: S2 Keep out of the reach of children.

The skin care company UNT (UNT Skincare, 2012) uses fullerene as an antioxidant marketed under the name Radical Sponge® which is supposed to protect skin from the adverse effects of free radicals. The company states on its website that clinical tests have proved the effi ciency of Radical Sponge in destroying free radicals on UV exposure. Products containing fullerene are marketed under the name ELIXIRIN C60 (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3 Effects of Radical sponge (UNT Skincare, 2012)

YONEX (Technologie Yonex, 2012) has developed a generation of fullerenes with 4 ribs, through which it transforms the fullerene molecules so that the carbon atoms are combined into the structure of a football. X-fullerenes are used in

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CAS No. 115383-22-7Classifi cation according to CLP

OKO Irrit. 2, STOT SE 3, H319, H 335.

Pictogram

H phrasesH319 - Causes serious eye irritation.H335 - May cause respiratory irritation.

P phrases

P261 - Avoid breathing dust/fume/gas/mist/vapours/spray.P305+P351+P338 - IF IN EYES: Rinse continuously with water for several minutes. Remove contact lens, if present and easy to do. Continue rinsing.

Classifi cation according to DSD - Dangerous Substances Directive (Chemical Act)

Xi, R 36/37

SymbolXi

R phrases R 36/37/38 - Irritating to eyes, respiratory system and skin.

S phrases

S26 - In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately with plenty of water and seek medical advice.S36 - Wear suitable protective clothing.

Physico-chemical propertiesAppearance crystalsMelting point > 280 °CMolecular weight 840.75 g.mol-1




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the manufacture of tennis rackets (see Fig. 4) in combination with a resin and carbon fi bres, creating a cross-linked structure. X-fullerene increased the racket frame toughness by 6 %, front stability by 25 %, and frame repulsion by 4 %. Thus the racket is more stable during forceful shots and even during off-centre shots.

Fig. 4 Structure of X-fullerenes (Technologie Yonex, 2012)

Although the danger is sometimes nearly invisible at fi rst glance, the fact that fullerenes may be toxic in certain circumstances should be borne in mind. Sometimes this is due to the solvents. Nanoparticles comprise a few atoms, all of them being located near the surface, and so it is easier for them to react with the atoms or molecules of other substances (Klouda and Kubátová, 2010).

Toxicity of fullerene, as mentioned above, is not clear so far. Different attitudes exist. It is clear that fullerenes, like other chemical substances, penetrate into the respiratory or gastrointestinal tract through the skin or by injection. In view of the results of studies devoted to the potential toxicity of fullerene when in contact with skin, stringent precautions should be applied. The use of personal protective equipment when handling fullerenes is imperative (Klouda and Kubátová, 2010). Due to its small size, fullerene can pass through cells in the body and react with them readily.

The behaviour of fullerene on its own and when present in solvents, as well as its interactions with the components of the environment, will presumably depend on the following factors:• Particle size;• Particle shape;• Surface area;• Solubility;• Charge;• Physico-chemical properties.

Carbon nanotubes have been reported to cause pathological changes in animal stomachs similar to those caused by asbestos fi bres, and to cause lung infl ammation and fi brosis on inhalation. Genotoxic effects of carbon nanotubes have also been observed.

Other studies exist, however, where the toxicity of carbon nanotubes does not seem to be that serious. On the contrary, fullerenes appear to be outstanding antioxidants (Prášek, 2011).

Results

Testing the environmental impacts

Environmental impact tests are suitable to gain information on the harmful effect of the substance on plants. Information so gained cannot be obtained by any other way.

The starting fullerene C60, 99.5 % purity, was obtained from SES Research Houston USA and its derivatives for the experiments were prepared at laboratories under the umbrella of the State Offi ce for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB). Apart from the standard test (Sinapis alba [white mustard] root growth inhibition) and the phytotest (plant root growth inhibition), the UV radiation test was performed (Drastichová, 2012).

Fullerene bromination through contact with bromine liquid was conducted in carbon tetrachloride, also in the laboratories under the SÚJB. The solvent and excess bromine were evaporated and the residue was dried to constant weight. Based on elemental analysis performed by the Institute of Chemical Technology in Prague (VŠCHT), the composition of the product was C60Br2. Additional techniques used to identify the substance included FTIR (Fig. 5 and 6), DTA and TGA (Zemanová and Klouda, 2011; Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 5 IR spectrum of the starting fullerene C60

Fig. 6 IR spectrum of the product C60Br2

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Comparison of TGA between the fullerene derivative and the starting fullerene revealed a substantial difference in thermal stability. No decomposition of the starting fullerene was observed up to 487 °C. The fi rst exothermic effect occurred at 540 °C, the next temperature maximum lay at 993 °C. Weight loss of the starting fullerene within the region of 22 °C - 1 100 °C was a mere 56.2 %. The development of thermal decomposition of the fullerene bromo derivative was different (Drastichová, 2012).

The thermal analysis was followed by toxicity testing of the samples using conventional toxicity tests and testing of the UV stability of the samples. One test type was represented by the root growth inhibition test on Sinapis alba, the other test type was represented by the root growth inhibition test on Tradescantia fl uminensis (Wandering Jew) and Peperomia argyreia applying a concentration of 0.67 g.l-1 (Drastichová, 2012).

Fullerene C60

No toxic effect was observed in the fi rst type test, i.e. on the roots of white mustard (Fig. 7). The opposite, i.e. root growth stimulation, was actually observed, although the test duration was extended. While initially the test was planned for 72 hours, the actual test duration was extended by another 7 days of action on the mustard seed (Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 7 Seeds in C60, H2O samples in 72 hours

In the second type test, the effect of fullerene on the growth of the roots and leaves of Tradescantia fl uminensis was examined (Fig. 8). The results relative to the control sample were unfavourable but not adverse. Four fewer roots grew, two leaves had signs of drying and two leaves had rotted away. Exposure time was 21 days. The adverse effects on the root growth and on the drying of the leaves were most pronounced during the fi rst 8 days. In 16 days, on the contrary, the roots grew faster than in the control sample and 3 roots exceeded the maximum length observed in the control sample. Thus, the test does not enable an unambiguous conclusion to be drawn as regards the toxic effect of fullerene on plants. On the other hand, a conclusion that fullerene was nontoxic cannot be drawn, either (Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 8 Tradescantia fl uminensis in a mixture of C60 and 75 ml of water

The UV test (Fig. 9), which was run for 150 hours, did not demonstrate any effect of radiation on fullerene; conversely, it gave evidence of the stability of fullerene under UV radiation (Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 9 Samples exposed to UV in darkness

Bromofullerene C60Brx

The fi rst type test, on mustard seeds, did not demonstrate any toxic effect of bromofullerene, either (Fig. 10). The roots were stimulated to a greater extent (by roughly 50 %) than with fullerene (Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 10 Seeds in C60Brx(1), H2O samples in 72 hours

In the second type test, the adverse effect on the plants was quite appreciable (Fig. 11). The number of roots grown was lower by 4, the leaves showed

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signs of drying and 2.5 leaves had rotted away. The Tradescantia roots were visually weaker than in the control sample, were not branched and their look was reminiscent of thread. The roots did not grow or spread in 8 days. Appreciable growth was only observed in 13 days. The root length did not exceed that in the control sample (Drastichová, 2012).

Fig. 11 Tradescantia fl uminensis in a mixture of C60Brx and 75 ml of water

Hence, bromofullerene had an appreciable adverse effect on Tradescantia fl uminensis, which could be caused by bromine, which is categorized as highly toxic, corrosive and dangerous to the environment (according to the Chemical Act). CLP defi nes this element as one with acute toxicity cat. 2, causing skin corrosion - cat. 1A, and dangerous to aquatic organisms.

The UV exposure test demonstrated a 7 % to 8 % weight loss against the initial weighed amount. This weight loss may also be due to the bromine in the fullerene molecule: bromine evaporates readily (due to the rather low boiling point, 58 °C) and is unstable (Drastichová, 2012).

ConclusionIn a published experiment where fullerenes had

been added to a fi sh tank, the nanoparticles penetrated through the gills and into the brains of the fi sh, where they harmed the brain cells. Adverse effects have also been observed in experiments where fullerene was added to a skin cell culture. One-half of cells died readily in a solution containing fullerenes at 20 ppb (Zemanová and Klouda, 2011; Slezák, 2011).

The tests performed by us did not prove the direct toxicity of fullerene or its bromo derivative; the results, however, cannot be regarded as conclusive. The tests should constitute a basis for additional experiments to identify the effects of fullerene and its derivatives on the environment as well as on human health. The high price of fullerene is an unfavourable factor affecting the resources available for experiments. This is why the tests were not adequately repeated, a restricted number of plant specimens was used, and a single fullerene concentration was applied.

If the properties of nanomaterials are unknown, precautionary measures can be effective if based on: • a list of nanomaterials which are in use, along with

their properties where available,• a description of technological, process and handling

operations where nanomaterials are involved,• a defi nition of exposure and its limits (technological,

organizational, collective or personal protection),• inspections of workplaces and effectiveness

assessment for the measures,• a description of circumstances where excessive

exposure to nanomaterials may occur in emergency situations,

• a list of exposed employees,• medical examinations of employees who may

come into contact with nanomaterials.

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KLOUDA, Karel, KUBÁTOVÁ, Hana (2010). Možné riziko výskytu uhlíkatých nanočástic v pevných produktech hoření. Nanosloučeniny a ŽP. BOZP info [online]. 2010 [cit. 2012-01-28]. Available at http://www.bozpinfo.cz/win/knihovna-bozp/citarna/tema_tydne/nanozp10.html. (in Czech)

LHOTÁK, Pavel (2004). Chemie fullerenu. In Chemie fullerenu [online]. Prague: Institute of Chemical Technology in Prague, 2004 [cit. 2011-03-22]. Available at: <http://www.uochb.cas.cz/Zpravy/PostGrad2004/7_Lhotak.pdf>.

MER CORPORATION. MSDS C60Br24. Arizona, USA, 2005. (in Czech)Millers oils. Millers oils [online]. 2009 [cit. 2012-01-25]. Available at: http://www.millersoils.cz/32--zavodni-

prevodove-oleje.html. (in Czech)NANO-C [online]. 2001, 2008 [cit. 2012-04-09]. Available at: http://www.nano-c.comRegulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration,

Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals and establishing a European Chemicals Agency). PRÁŠEK, Jan (2011). Uhlíkové nanočástice: GRAFEN, NANOTRUBICE, FULLERENY [online]. Brno, 2011

[cit. 2012-01-28]. Available at: http://www.umel.feec.vutbr.cz/nanoteam/data/soubory/CTN,%20grafen,%20fullerenCNTs+grafen+fullereny.pdf. Instruction and study materials. (in Czech)

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee. Regulatory aspects of Nanomaterials. Brussels, 17.6.2008, 11 p. Available at: http://www.nanotechnologie.cz/storage/COM(2008).pdf. (in Czech)

SKŘEHOT, Petr, RUPOVÁ, Marcela (2009). Aktuální otázky bezpečnosti práce s nanomateriály. In NANOCON 2009: Proceedings [online]. Rožnov pod Radhoštěm: NANOCON, 2009 [cit. 2011-03-22]. Available at: <http://nanotechnologie.cz/storage/058.pdf>. (in Czech)

SLEZÁK, Jaroslav (2011). Enviromentální rizika nanotechnologií. Ostrava, 2011. Thesis. VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava. (in Czech)

Technologie YONEX. Uni-sport [online]. [cit. 2012-01-30]. Available at: http://www.uni-sport.cz/technologie-yonex.html. (in Czech)

UNT Skincare. UNT Skincare [online]. [cit. 2012-01-30]. Available at: http://www.shopunt.com/cz/product/ProductDetail.aspx?id=1303&Name=ELIXIRIN+C60+PRECIOUS+EYE+COMPLEX***

ZEMANOVÁ, Eva, KLOUDA, Karel (2011). Hydroxylovaný fulleren C60 kyselinou peroctovou a jeho radiprotektivní účinky testované in vivo. Bezpečnost jaderné energie. 2011, p. 28-37. ISSN 1210-7085. (in Czech)

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QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN THE AREA OF HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT USING THE MERIT METHOD - CASE STUDYZygmunt KORBAN1

1 Silesian University of Technology, Faculty of Mining and Geology, Gliwice Poland, [email protected]

Abstract: This article discusses the results of audit examinations of the health and safety management system performed in the years 2007 - 2012 on a group of the MSz - I shaft department supervisory employees at the “Jan” Coal Mine. The linear trend function was used for description of changes in rating indices - the evaluation of goodness of fi t between the theoretical data of the trend function and the set of empirical data was made and the seasonal fl uctuations were distinguished.

Keywords: Health, Safety, Management, Model, Trend.

Research article

IntroductionOn the rising tide of the structural and system

changes that took place in the late 1990s in Poland, the interest in new management trends appeared among other things. Quality management, environmental management as well as health and safety management are new fi elds of science, which have been developing dynamically over of the last two decades.

The substantive premises that lay at the root of implementing the health and safety management idea (HSMS) also in Poland include not only the limited effectiveness of the work safety analysis methods that have been used so far (retrospective assessment of causes and circumstances of accidents), but also the reasons of a legal (need for adjusting the legal solutions applicable in Poland to those in the member states of the European Union), organisational (need for making use and processing of possessed information resources related to the state of hazards), economical (relationship between work safety and profi tability of coal mines) and social nature (no public opinion’s acceptance of working under conditions which are dangerous to life and health).

The technical means used at present to improve the occupational health and safety status have reached the level satisfactory enough that causes of accidents/dangerous incidents should be more and more often sought in the way how people conduct and behave when working. This statement is supported, among other things, by accident statistics - as early as in the beginning of the 1990s, the State Mining Authority drew attention to the fact

that approx. 90 % of mining accidents occur due to reasons attributable to human nature (Departament Ochrony Zdrowia i Warunków Pracy Wyższego Urzędu Górniczego, 1994). Therefore, in addition to the investigation of causes and circumstances of accidents, preventive measures are taken and the example is the so-called employee participation in the area of management. The co-responsibility of the personnel for the occupational health and safety level in their parent plant with possibility of infl uencing directly the directions of activities undertaken to improve the occupational health and safety level are refl ected in the conception of development and implementation of health and safety management systems. According to PN-N 18001, the implementation of any health and safety management system is a complex and long-term process, one of the basic elements of which is to defi ne the effective way of monitoring the activities undertaken and supervision of their performance at every management level (PN - N 18004, 2001). These objectives are realised, among other things, by the use of audit examinations of the health and safety management system. These examinations are to defi ne whether the activities undertaken as a part of the health and safety management system and the obtained results correspond to the expected fi ndings and whether these fi ndings have been implemented and are suitable for conducting the occupational health and safety policy as well as for accomplishment of the organisation’s objectives in this fi eld. In other words, the occupational safety management system audit is a tool for and forms of work safety controlling.

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Materials and methodsRegardless of the concerned organisation

level, the work safety management system audit should include the following formalised execution procedures:1. Identifi cation of the purpose and subject of

examinations.2. Identifi cation of problem areas in work safety

management and preparation of the questionnaire form.

3. Determination of the group of personnel subject to examinations (the whole population or a representative group).

4. Execution of questionnaires.5. Development of rating matrices and calculation

of rating indices.6. Updating the ratings in the adopted time horizon.

The example of method used in audit examinations of HSMS is the MERIT (Management Evaluation Regarding Itemized Tendentious) questionnaire. This questionnaire consists of 29 questions in nine problem area groups (area A, B, C, … I):A. Scheduling of activities in the area of health and

safety management (4 questions).B. Investigation of accidents (6 questions).C. OHS control and inspection (3 questions).D. Observation and analysis of how the work is

performed (4 questions).E. Personal protection (1 question).F. OHS regulations at the plant (2 questions).G. Informing on OHS status (3 questions).H. Promotion of OHS (3 questions).I. Personal assessment of OHS conditions at the

plant (3 questions).

The respondents are to circle one answer to each of the questions, scored from 0 to 4 (0 - fail, 4 - ideal), i.e. the answer which, in the respondent’s opinion, provides the best description of the performance status of activities undertaken in specifi c health and safety management area. The following is determined based on the questionnaires:• partial rating indices for individual problem areas

(WOPA, WOPB, WOPC, .... WOPI), where:

wherej prescribed rating;cj number of responses to the evaluation j;p number of questions within the problem area;n the number of experts rating;

• fi nal health and safety management quality rating index (WZBP), which is the arithmetic mean of the partial indicators of rating WOPA, .... WOPI .

The mathematical model of the method is discussed in (Korban, 2001; Krzemień, 1996).

Results

Discussion of the results of questionnaire surveys conducted at the MSz - I department of the “Jan” Coal Mine

The scope of the said surveys conducted in the years 2007 - 2012 included the whole supervision personnel (at lower, middle and higher level) of the MSz - I, it's mean 12 people (this number did not change in subsequent surveys which were repeated every quarter). The surveys were repeated once every three months, which allowed the construction of time series consisting of 24 elements. Due to its method, the survey can be referred to as the “survey in the fi eld”. As composition of the general community remained practically constant in time (which should be associated with the ban on taking new employees in the coalmine and specifi city of work in the department), these surveys can also be considered as the panel ones (Steczkowski, 1995).

The survey results in the form of WOPi partial ratings and fi nal WZBP index are presented in Tab. 1.

The summary of evaluation measures of goodness of fi t between the theoretical data of the trend function and the set of empirical data is presented in Tab. 2.

The seasonal fl uctuations are presented in Tab. 3.

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4

0( , , .... )

jj

A B C I

jcWOP

pn




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Tab. 1 Summary of WOPi partial ratings and fi nal WZBP index

Problem area

2007 2008 2009

1st

quarter2nd

quarter3rd

quarter4th

quarter1st

quarter2nd

quarter3rd

quarter4th

quarter1st

quarter2nd

quarter3rd

quarter4th

quarter

WOPi

A 2.95 2.91 2.92 2.95 3.02 2.98 3.01 2.98 3.01 3.1 3.02 3.03

B 2.85 3.01 3.09 3.12 3.02 3.15 3.01 3.06 3.14 3.09 3.19 3.2

C 3.01 2.97 2.86 2.78 2.79 2.91 2.76 2.87 2.99 2.93 3.04 3.08

D 2.47 2.65 2.5 2.79 2.92 2.65 2.97 3.1 2.86 2.9 3.26 3.73

E 3.01 3.25 2.86 3.05 2.97 2.79 2.82 2.76 3.05 2.97 3.05 2.7

F 2.45 2.34 2.43 2.45 2.83 2.32 2.39 2.41 2.19 2.56 2.78 3.05

G 2.79 2.69 2.81 2.84 2.84 2.73 2.73 2.61 2.51 2.64 2.73 2.63

H 2.35 2.53 2.34 2.51 2.51 2.49 2.48 2.34 2.51 2.51 2.62 2.54

I 2.74 3.01 2.78 2.89 3.01 2.96 3.13 3.01 2.97 2.31 2.97 2.97

WZBP

2.74 2.82 2.73 2.82 2.88 2.78 2.81 2.79 2.80 2.78 2.96 2.99

Problem area

2010 2011 2012

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

A 2.99 3.14 3.06 3.06 3.05 3.04 3.09 3.02 3.14 3.15 3.11 3.12

B 3.23 3.17 3.01 3.23 3.15 3.21 3.26 3.18 3.26 3.19 3.33 3.12

C 3.27 3.02 3.27 3.3 3.15 3.1 2.97 3.21 3.18 3.21 3.15 3.26

D 3.05 3.73 3.25 3.43 3.25 3.25 2.5 3.35 3.5 3.25 3.45 3.47

E 3.05 3.2 2.71 3.1 3.25 3.44 3.1 3.14 3.25 3.47 3.34 3.1

F 3.38 2.96 2.99 3.01 3.07 3.06 2.89 3.21 3.12 3.14 3.16 3.11

G 2.63 2.49 2.49 2.56 2.47 2.56 2.61 2.59 2.56 2.49 2.51 2.47

H 2.48 2.45 2.51 2.48 2.38 2.51 2.62 2.51 2.51 2.45 2.67 2.67

I 2.97 3.05 3.54 3.29 3.24 3.24 3.28 3.28 3.31 3.03 3.31 3.29

WZBP

3.01 3.02 2.98 3.05 3.00 3.05 2.92 3.05 3.09 3.04 3.11 3.07

Tab. 2 Evaluation measures of goodness of fi t between the theoretical data of the trend function and the set of empirical data

Problem area

Linear trend function ŷt = at + b

Standard deviation of residual component (average

error of estimate) S(et)

Coeffi cient of determination R2

Standard errors of structural parameters of linear trend function

S(a) S(b)

A ŷt = 0,008t + 2,934 0.040 0.680 0.001 0.017

B ŷt = 0,011t + 3,004 0.077 0.495 0.002 0.032

C ŷt = 0,018t + 2,826 0.114 0.552 0.003 0.048

D ŷt = 0,035t + 2,652 0.288 0.442 0.008 0.121

E ŷt = 0,016t + 2,861 0.187 0.274 0.006 0.079

F ŷt = 0,040t + 2,302 0.211 0.654 0.006 0.089

G ŷt = -0,014t + 2,796 0.073 0.646 0.002 0.031

H ŷt = 0,006t + 2,423 0.080 0.231 0.002 0.034

I ŷt = 0,022t + 2,789 0.201 0.389 0.006 0.085




12

In case of the analysed problem areas, the linear trend function was used for description of changes in rating indices - for the fi nal WZBP rating index the function takes the form of ŷt = 0,016t + 2,732 (coeffi cient of determination R2 = 0.793).

In case of three problem areas: A - “Scheduling of activities in the area of health and safety management”, F - “OHS regulations at the plant” and G - “Informing on OHS status”, the fi tting of trend function was highest and amounted to: 68.0 %, 65.4 % and 64.6 %, respectively (standard errors of parameters “a” and “b” are provided in Tab. 1).

The coeffi cient of determination reached its lowest value for areas H - “Promotion of OHS” (R2 = 0.231) and E - “Personal protection” (R2 = 0.274).

The downward trend of WOPi rating indices was reported in case of area G - “Informing on OHS status” only. For other problem areas, there was the upward trend - most distinctly in areas F - “OHS regulations at the plant” (a = 0.044) and A - “Scheduling of activities in the area of health and safety management” (a = 0.032).

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Tab. 3 Raw and adjusted frequency indices for individual quarters (by individual problem areas)

Problem area

Raw seasonal indices Adjustment factor

Adjusted seasonal indices

1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter

A 0.0047 0.0233 -0.0030 -0.0193 0.0014 0.0033 0.0219 -0.0044 -0.0207

B -0.0167 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0063 -0.0053 -0.0114 0.0059 0.0066 -0.0011

C 0.0410 -0.0187 -0.0517 0.0053 -0.0060 0.0470 -0.0127 -0.0457 0.0113

D 0.1503 0.2327 0.1683 0.5107 0.2655 -0.1152 -0.0328 -0.0972 0.2452

E 0.4157 0.5237 0.3350 0.3480 0.4056 0.0101 0.1181 -0.0706 -0.0576

F 0.0980 -0.0520 -0.0487 0.0113 0.0022 0.0958 -0.0542 -0.0508 0.0092

G -0.0087 -0.0280 0.0327 0.0167 0.0032 -0.0118 -0.0312 0.0295 0.0135

H 0.0147 0.0750 0.1520 0.1473 0.0973 -0.0826 -0.0223 0.0548 0.0501

I 0.0090 -0.1197 0.0933 0.0247 0.0018 0.0072 -0.1215 0.0915 0.0228

Due to the impact of seasonal fl uctuations, the differences between the determined rating index and trend were highest for area D - “Observation and analysis of how the work is performed” (in the 4th quarters, WOPD value was higher as compared to the trend by 0.2452), area I - “Personal assessment of OHS conditions at the plant” (in the 2nd quarters, WOPI value was lower as compared to the trend by 0.1215) and E - “Personal protection” (in the 2nd quarters, WOPE value was higher as compared to the trend by 0.1181). The empirical areas of variability are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.

Fig. 1 Empirical areas of variability in successive survey editions in the years 2007 - 2012




13

Fig. 2 Empirical areas of variability for areas A-I in the years 2007 - 2012

The highest diversity in obtained values of WOPi indices were reported in the 2nd quarter of 2010 (1.28), 4th quarter of 2009 (1.19) and 3rd quarter of 2010 (1.05), while the least diverse values - in the 1st quarter of 2008 (0.51).

Over the analysed period, the highest range was reported in areas D - “Observation and analysis of how the work is performed” (1.26), I - “Personal assessment of OHS conditions at the plant” (1.23) and F - “OHS regulations at the plant” (1.19), while the least for areas: A - “Scheduling of activities in the area of health and safety management” (0.24), H - “Promotion of OHS” (0.33) and G - “Informing on OHS status” (0.37).

Taking into consideration the average values of WOPi rating indices, it can be stated that the highest rating was given to areas B and D (for areas I, E, C and A the ratings are slightly lower, but on a very similar level). For areas F, G and H the fi nal ratings are defi nitely worse.

The fi rst place in the ranking was taken by area B - “Investigation of accidents” (WOPB = 3.14). This area was placed fi rst 5 times in the successive editions of the survey. The quality of activities taken

by the occupational health and safety services in the fi eld of investigations of work accidents was assessed highly. In the respondents’ opinion, these investigations are characterised by a careful analysis of every accident case, each time ended with a preparation and implementation of relevant preventive measures. The respondents drew attention to the need of including near-miss incidents in these investigations too (pre-accident prevention), which should not be a surprise taking into consideration the fact that the survey concerned the

supervision personnel (employees with secondary and higher technical education).

The second place in the ranking of problem areas was taken by area D - “Observation and analysis of how the work is performed” (WOPD = 3.10). This area was placed fi rst as many as 10 times in the successive editions of the survey repeated in subsequent quarters. In the respondents’ opinion, the work supervision is correct, work instructions and technologies are developed on an ongoing basis, at higher and higher co-participation of physical workers with highest seniority and experience.

The third place in the ranking was taken by area I “Personal assessment of OHS conditions at the plant” (WOPI = 3,07). The employees appreciate the involvement of the coal mine management personnel in activities undertaken to create proper (i.e. safe) working conditions. This rating corresponds to those obtained by areas E - “Personal protection” (WOPE = 3.06), C - “OHS control and inspection” (WOPC = 3.05) and A - „Scheduling of activities in the area of health and safety management” (WOPA = 3.04). The respondents declared free access to the personal protection equipment, which should be associated with specifi city of the works carried out by the “shaft department” (works at height, shaft revisions, replacements of lifting slings or ropes

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etc). The inspections are carried out in a reliable and prompt manner.

The respondents declared the knowledge of work safety policy assumptions adopted by the plant, which is undoubtedly the result of activities undertaken in connection with applying for the certifi cate confi rming the implementation of health and safety management system by the coal mine.

Defi nitely, the lowest values of the WOPi index were reported in areas F - “OHS regulations at the plant” (WOPF = 2.80), G - “Informing on OHS status” (WOPG = 2.62) and H - “Promotion of OHS” (WOPH = 2.50) - the last one was placed on the last (tenth) place as many as 14 times in the successive editions of the survey. The main reason for this state of affairs is, in the respondents’ opinion, the timing issues when dividing the personnel for assigned tasks. According to the surveyed supervision personnel, the disproportion between the amount of available time during the divisions and the range of information to be provided to the employees indicates the urgent need to make changes. In the respondents’ opinion, there is no even the possibility to exhaustively provide the employees with information on OHS status discussed during the supervision briefi ngs. The problem can be solved neither by traditional (charts, radio broadcasting system) nor modern (multimedia presentations) forms of promoting safe behaviours. According to the respondents, in case of the fi rst one the information is updated very seldom and provided in an uninteresting form, while in case of the latter - it is impossible to watch the broadcast for a longer time due to the location of information display screens (in the pithead building). The

attempts to familiarise the employees with OHS regulations on a wider scale are taken, among other things, by organisation of competitions of OHS knowledge, however they do not enjoy higher interest of the personnel. In the respondents’ opinion, different solutions should be looked for, such as, for example, the simulations to illustrate the possibility of obtaining measurable fi nancial benefi ts by the plant and employees themselves (lower insurance premium, lower costs of compensation, positive marketing effects etc).

ConclusionThe labour market situation, strong competition

and care of the company image cause that the need to pay higher and higher attention not only to the issues related to production itself, but also to the issues related to work safety, quality and ecology is discerned. The quality assessment of activities undertaken in the area of work safety management is undoubtedly the tool, which may contribute to the improvement in both the economic result and the way of perceiving the company. The issues presented in this article are the example of how audit examinations can be used for both promoting the idea of personnel participation and determination of the necessary directions of corrective actions (identifi cation of the so-called “strong” and “weak” points in the area of OHS management), while the discussed procedures create conditions for application of organisational improvements that may contribute to the enhancement of OHS level without the need of increasing the costs of production itself.

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ReferencesKORBAN, Zygmunt (2001). Analiza strukturalnego zróżnicowania jakości zarządzania bezpieczeństwem pracy

na przykładzie kopalni węgla kamiennego. Rozprawa doktorska. Gliwice, Polska: Politechnika Śląska, 2001, pp. 91-93. (in Polish).

KRZEMIEŃ, Stanisław (1996). Program MERIT - rankingowa ocena bezpieczeństwa pracy w kopalni. In: Doświadczenia polskie i amerykańskie w zarządzaniu bezpieczeństwem pracy w górnictwie. Seminarium Międzynarodowe. Rudy Raciborskie, Polska: Polsko-Amerykańskie Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Pracy w Górnictwie, 1996, pp. 25-31. (in Polish).

PN - N 18004. Systemy zarządzania bezpieczeństwem i higiena pracy. Wytyczne. Polski Komitet Normalizacyjny. Warszawa 2001. (in Polish).

DEPARTAMENT OCHRONY ZDROWIA I WARUNKÓW PRACY WYŻSZEGO URZĘDU GÓRNICZEGO Stan bezpieczeństwa w górnictwie węgla kamiennego. Katowice 1994. (in Polish).

STECZKOWSKI, Jan (2001). Metoda reprezentacyjna w badaniach zjawisk ekonomiczno - społecznych. Warszawa-Kraków, Polska: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1995, pp. 18. ISBN 83-01-11927-6. (in Polish).




15

ANALYSIS OF THE POWDERED MATERIAL PRODUCED BY PROCESSING OF DIFFERENT WOOD SAMPLESEva MRAČKOVÁ1, Verica MILANKO2, Dušan GAVANSKI3, Borislav SIMENDIĆ4

1 Technical university in Zvolen, Faculty of wood and science technology, Department of Fire protection, Zvolen, Slovak Republic, [email protected]

2 School of Professional Higher Education, Novi Sad, Serbia, [email protected] School of Professional Higher Education, Novi Sad, Serbia, [email protected] School of Professional Higher Education, Novi Sad, Serbia, [email protected]

Abstract: Mechanical wood processing creates a large quantity of wood waste and hazardous dust. If adequate measures for their removal from the workplace are not undertaken, there is a potential danger to the health, and even lives of the workers. A research was conducted in order to determine the degree of risk to workers in such workshops. Analyzed was the powdered material with the granulometric analysis produced during the processing of solid wood spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) and of agglomerated material particleboard. A comparison was made between the particle size distribution of the powdered wood materials that are produced during processing on a thickness planer surface planer, and circular saw. In order to assess the health risks, also measured was the amount of fi nely powdered, airborne dust particles.The lower explosion limit of wood dust was determined in laboratory conditions, and the obtained values were compared to the relevant measurements from the workplace.

Keywords: Wood, Sawing, Spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., Beech (Fagus sylvatica L.), Particleboard.

Research article

Introduction

Explosive atmosphere

The technological process of mechanical treatment and processing of wood produces a large quantity of wood waste. The amount of waste, as well as its dimensions and shape, depend on the type of machine, the degree of processing and the species of wood. Certain operations such as cutting, sanding, and polishing can produce large quantities of fi ne wood dust (Orémusová et al., 2012). Fine dust can be harmful to workers’ health, and can also explode. This would not only cause signifi cant material damages, but it would also endanger the lives of the employees, the residents in the near vicinity, and can also have a detrimental impact on the environment.

For an explosion of wood dust to occur, certain physical-chemical conditions must be satisfi ed at a given place and at the same time:• a suffi cient amount of oxygen or oxidant;• a source of ignition;• an appropriate size of the wood dust particles;• the mixture’s concentration must be within

explosion limits, between the upper and lower explosion limits.

If all of these conditions are not fulfi lled, the occurrence of an explosion or fi re is not possible.

One of the more important factors when it comes to dust explosiveness is the size of the particles. The reduction of the particles’ size signifi cantly increases their total surface, which increases their chemical activity, i.e. their ability to oxidize. In terms of the risk of explosion, smaller particles are always more explosive and dangerous than dust particles of larger dimensions. The upper limit for particle sizes that can cause an explosion, according to Pritchard, is 0.5 mm. As soon as the dust particles are fi ner the maximum explosiveness of the powder is higher, and thus it requires less energy to ignite (Pritchard, 2004). In the usual technical dusts, the lower explosive limit (LEL) is between 20 and 60 g.m-3. For most materials the LEL is approximately 50 g.m-3, while the upper explosive limit (UEL) is between 2000 and 6 000 g.m-3 or 2 - 6 kg.m-3.

Particle size has a direct impact on the stability of systems, where systems with smaller particles are always more stable than systems with larger particles. Settling velocity also depends on the size of the particles. Particles that are larger than 0.025 mm settle relatively quickly, and from the aspect of industrial hygiene they are not particularly dangerous to human health, but as deposited dust,

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under certain conditions, they can pose a certain danger in terms of ignition and fi re (Milanko et al., 2010). The dangers of explosion caused by deposited dust are more frequent in industrial facilities, due to:• Heated surfaces on which the dust settles, where

ignition of a dust layer can occur above smolder temperature;

• Whirling of the accumulated dust due to mechanical processes, airfl ow, or ventilation, can create an explosive atmosphere (secondary explosion).

Dusty environment

Exposure to dust in the workplace represents a potential health problem. Inhalation of wood dust can cause allergic symptoms of the respiratory system’s mucous membrane. If large quantities of dust are present, it has an irritant effect on the eyes, nose and throat. Signifi cant accumulations of fi ne particles can damage lung function, trigger asthma and have a carcinogenic effect. In order to protect the health and safety of workers, the limit values for wood dust have been prescribed (Karabasil and Jakovljević, 2007). For the inhalation fraction for hard wood species, the European Union Guidelines prescribe a limit value of 5 mg.m-3 (Council Directive 99/38/EC). TWA is Measured or calculated in relation to a reference period of eight hours time-weighted-average.

The standard that was developed under the OSHA PEL (OSHA 3371- 08, 2009) (on permissible exposure limits), prescribes:• TWA 15 mg.m-3 for the total wood dust (hard and

soft), and • TWA 5 mg.m-3 for respiratory wood dust (hard and

soft).

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - NIOSH prescribes a REL (recommended exposure limit) of TWA 1 mg.m-3. The MDHS14/3 for hard and soft wood dust prescribes a TWA (workplace exposure limit) of 5 mg.m-3 TWA for eight hours (MDHS 14/3, 2000).

Materials and methodsThe research was conducted in a carpentry

workshop that manufactures furniture. The carpentry workshop for cutting and processing wood and similar materials uses a combined planer surface planer, thickness planer a circular saw and mechanized hand tools.

The surface planer is used to level the solid wood and create a base plane, according to thickness and

width (Hauert and Vogl, 1995). By their design, these machines represent a combination of a surface planer, (Fig. 1) and an thickness planer (Fig. 2). During research on the combined machine, the leveling of solid wood spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., beech (Fagus sylvatica L.), was performed, where the fi rst chosen cutting thickness was 1 mm.

Fig. 1 Surface planer

Fig. 2 Thickness planer

Fig. 3 Circular saw

Also performed during the research was longitudinal cutting of solid wood spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., beech (Fagus sylvatica L.), and particleboard, using a circular saw machine (Fig. 3).

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The machines for cutting and processing wood are not connected to special devices for vacuuming and collecting wood dust into fabric bag fi lters.

Size analysis of the samples

Analysis of screening is the oldest, simplest and cheapest method for detecting the particle size of solids. This method is called to a small group fractionation and separation techniques for particle size analysis. (Fig. 4) Analysis of screening is based on the use of sets of sieves of known mesh size, which is drawn in the direction of gravity transport of the analyte in the block with gradually shrinking the size of the holes. Solids can be analyzed either in dry or in suspension. After fractionation of each site remains a part of the original sample, which contains particles within specifi ed size holes top and bottom screen. The rest of the site will be considered and the result is evaluated as the weight fractions of defi ned particle size range. Sieve analysis results in terms of weight of each fraction and also real samples with a defi ned particle size are the biggest advantages of this method (N01-ES-85421, 2000).

For granulometric analysis, samples of the fragmented wood were separated into fractions on a sieve shaker from the manufacturer Endecotts Limited, with sieve sizes of (sides of the square hole) 10, 2, 1, 0.5, and 0.315 mm. The samples were sieved for 15 minutes, and the process was repeated three times.

Fig. 4 Sets of analytical sieving machines

Determination of the amount of wood dust in the air

The measurement was performed using direct reading instrument Microdust Pro (Fig. 5). The Microdust Pro. From Casella CEL is a portable, real-time monitor for assessing the concentration of suspended particulate matter. Instrument is available with the ability to measure from 1 μg.m-3 to 2 500 mg.m-3. The Microdust Pro measures particulate concentrations using a near forward

angle light scattering technique. Infrared light of 880 nm wavelength is projected through the sensing volume where contact with particles causes the light to scatter. The amount of scatter is proportional to the mass concentration and is measured by the photo-detector (N01-ES-85421, 2000). Dust concentrations are presented in two unique ways:• numerical values - instantaneous concentrations

are displayed, as well as values for the Time Weighted Average (TWA) and maximum concentrations,

• graphical representation - the graph is able to show a continuous trace over a number of time-bases. These may be set on the x- axis at 100 seconds, 200 seconds, 15 minutes and 1 hour. The y-axis may be auto-ranging or fi xed.

Fig. 5 Portable Mikrodust Pro

Assessment of the lower explosion limit (LEL) for wood dust

Explosion limits have a practical importance because they are used for assessing the danger within an environment. An assessment of the risk of explosion suggests the solution for anti-explosion protection.

Real working conditions differ from laboratory ones, thus it is important tobe aware of possible effects on explosion limits when the danger is evaluated.

The speed of fl ame during an explosion depends on the amount of combustible material, as well on the oxidation substance. The lower limit represents the point when the concentration of the accumulated wood dust can activate an explosion.

This method is based on the burning ability of dispersed wood dust mixture with air, after a spark by an ignition source with a suffi cient amount of energy.

LEL is expressed by the value that lies between the explosion and non-explosion scale. This limit is presented in g.m-3. LEL is of great importance for estimating the risk of explosion within technology systems in which this dispersed substance can be found (Mračková, 2006). Information about the LEL value can be used detection of a danger from fi re or explosion of fl ammable industrial dust according to EN ISO 1127 - 1 (EN ISO 1127 - 1, 2001).

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LEL assessment is performed under laboratory conditions in explosion chamber VK 100 (Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8). The results are then classifi ed according to LEL evaluation criterions into explosion classes is Tab. 1.

Tab. 1 Evaluation criterions of LEL

In order to determine the explosion limits wood dust samples were prepared out of spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) and particleboard. They were smoothed out with a band abrasive stick. Abrasive paper Norton P 100 H 231 was used for to produce the wood dust. A sieve analysis must be done before every measurement and LEL assessment because of evaluation of the level of disintegration of the basic material. The larger particles were removed from the sample leaving only the dust consisting of 0 - 0,5 mm particles.

Fig. 6 Explosive chamber VK 100

Fig. 7 Inner space VK 100

Fig. 8 Operator control unit

Results and Discussion

Size analysis of the samples

Based on the measured individual fractions, the percentage shares of the wood waste samples from spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst., beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) and particleboard have been calculated, and the results are shown in the graphs Fig. 9, 10 and 11. The ordinate axis shows the share values of individual fractions in %, while the abscissa axis shows the particle size of the fractions in mm.

Fig. 9 Distribution of particle size of beech(Fagus sylvatica, L.)

Fig. 10 Distribution of particle size of spruce (Picea abies, L.) Karst.

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Class Characteristics Criterion1 highly explosive dust 4 g.m-3 < LEL ≤ 40 g.m-3

2 explosive dust 40 g.m-3 < LEL ≤ 200 g.m-3

3 hardly explosive dust 200 g.m-3 < LEL ≤ 700 g.m-3

4 explosion proof 700 g.m-3 < LEL

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

[ ]%

> < [ ]10 10 - 2 2 - 1 1- 0,5 0,5 - 0,315 0,315 mm

Thickness planer

Suface planer

Circular saw

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

[ ]%

> < [ ]10 10 - 2 2 - 1 1- 0,5 0,5 - 0,315 0,315 mm

Thickness planer

Suface planer

Circular saw




19

Fig. 11 Distribution of particle size of particleboard

The results indicate that the processing of spruce with a diht machine mostly creates fractions of larger dimensions, where more than 60 % are larger than 10 mm, while cutting with a circular saw produced a larger percentage of powdered material of smaller dimensions, between 0.5 and 2 mm. In the beech samples the material was generally more powdered, where only a slight amount was larger than 10 mm, while most particles range between 0.5 and 10 mm. Očkajova et al., have presented similar fi ndings in their work (Očkajová et al., 2006).

The particleboard sample was processed only by cutting with a circular saw, and as much as over 60 % of the particles were smaller than 0.5 mm, out of which half are smaller than 0.315 mm.

Some studies found that the distribution of particles varies considerably depending on the type of wood and processing operations, where sanding produces a larger number of small particles, while sawing produces a larger number of large particles.

The measured quantity of the amount of wood dust in the air

The measured results show mentions, tabular dust data spruce (Picea abies, L.) Karst. Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 with the fundamental measured data of dust spruce (Picea abies, L.) Karst.

Fig. 12 Spreadsheet display with measured data of dust spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst.

Fig. 13 The resulting graph with the fundamental measured data of dust spruce (Picea abies L.) Karst.

The results of measuring (Tab. 2) the Time Weighted Average (TWA) show different values depending on the type of wood material, as well as the type of processing. When it comes to working on a circular saw, the obtained values for all of the samples are worrisome. The particleboard samples, as expected, recorded high concentrations of 29.24 mg.m-3, which can be considered very dangerous in terms of a threat to the workers’ health. During the processing of solid wood with a combined machine, the values of the measured concentrations were net lower, but they exceed the values for respiratory dust (5 mg.m-3) according to OSHA (OSHA 3371- 08, 2009), as well as inhalable dust according to the Guidelines of the European Union.

Tab. 2 The maximum and average concentrations of wood dust in the samples from the workplace

Assessment of the lower explosion limit (LEL) for wood dust

The experimental values for LEL assessment were obtained in an explosion chamber and the results are given in Tab. 3.

Tab. 3 Mutual comparison of the results of the LEL experimental assessment

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Wood dust and agglomerated material

Beech wood (Fagus sylvatica L.) Spruce wood (Picea abies, L.) Karst. Particleboard

Thickness planer

Surface planer

Circular saw

Thickness planer

Surface planer

Circular saw Circular saw

Max.conc.

[mg.m-3]30.91 19.14 36.13 43.61 37.91 28.65 73.66

TWA [mg.m-3] 7.75 6.27 12.24 4.71 7.68 10.65 29.24

Sample LEL [g.m-3]

Spruce - fraction (0 - 0.5 mm) 56.0

Beech - fraction (0 - 0.5 mm) 60.0

Particleboard - fraction (0 - 0.5 mm) 58.0

> < [ ]10 10 - 2 2 - 1 1- 0,5 0,5 - 0,315 0,315 mm

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

[ ]%

Circular saw




20

According to the LEL criterions (Tab. 1) we can say that the wood dust of spruce, beech and particleboard can be considered as explosive dust in the range between 40 g.m-3 and 200 g.m-3.

The data obtained in the experimental research shows that the values of dangerous explosion limit concentrations are higher than those measured in the carpentry workshop. However, when working in real conditions, it should be remembered that there can be occurrences of subsequent whirling of accumulated dust, and that there are sources of ignition which can ignite wood and lead to fi re and explosion.

ConclusionBased on the performed measurements and

analyzed data, it has been determined that processing of solid wood (beech and spruce) and particleboard, without application of any protection measures on the machines, produces a considerable amount of powdered wood material and fi ne dust, in amounts that threaten the safety of workers and the work space. The granulometric analysis of individual fractions showed that the processing of spruce wood with a combined diht machine produces wood waste that consists predominately of fragmented particles that are mostly larger (over 10 mm) than those produced by processing beech wood. During the cutting of the samples on the circular saw, the largest amount of powdered waste material was obtained with the particleboard, where over 60 % was of dimensions below 0.5 and 0.315 mm.

The measurements of fi ne dust in the atmosphere around the machines showed that the produced amount of dust was within limits that threaten the health of workers. Especially large amounts were reported when working on a circular saw. The average TWA values, measured with the Microdust Pro instrument, were 29.24 mg.m-3 for the particleboard, 12.24 mg.m-3 for beech, and 10.65 mg.m-3 for spruce. All of the measured values exceed the values for respiratory dust (5 mg.m-3) according to OSHA, and inhalable dust according to the Guidelines of the European Union.

The explosion limit values that were determined in laboratory conditions amounted to 56.0 g.m-3 and 60.0 g.m-3. The maximum value that was measured in the workshop was 73.66 mg.m-3, which is signifi cantly lower than an

explosively dangerous concentration. However, a large amount of dust deposited on the fl oors and machines was detected in the workshop, and if not removed regularly and properly, it could easily begin to whirl and create conditions that could lead to fi re and an explosion. The risk of ignition sources should not be ruled out either, such as a spark of static electricity or sparks caused by friction, a heated surface, cigarettes, etc.

Making the situation worse is the fact that workers avoid using personal protective equipment, thus increasing the possibility of disease from inhaling dust and its deposition in the lungs. Therefore, in order to provide better working conditions, occupational safety and health protection of workers, it is necessary to insist on the use of personal protective equipment, for the protection of the eyes and respiratory organs (Milanko et al., 2010). The recommended measures are maintaining hygiene of the workspace, constant cleaning and removal of wood waste, ventilation, control of the safety and functioning of machinery and installations, as well as other potential sources of ignition that may cause fi re and explosion.

In order to prevent the ignition and explosion of dust in the workplace, it is necessary to constantly control and remove dust, so that it does not pile up and deposit on fl oors, equipment, machines and other surfaces. Also avoided should be activities that lead to whirling of the deposited dust and the occurrence of dust clouds (using compressed air, brooms, brushes, etc.).

Modern facilities utilize dust collection systems. Special equipment for vacuuming and collecting dust is installed onto the woodworking machines. However, many small workshops and facilities in Serbia still operate in adverse conditions. Sometimes the cause of this is a lack of fi nancial resources, while more often it is neglect, or a lack of awareness of the danger. This paper is based on research conducted in a carpentry workshop, with an aim of analyzing the impact of work conditions on the work environment, as well as the potential threat to the workers’ health.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors wish to thank the fi nancial support

of the grant Project No.VEGA1/0345/12.

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ReferencesCOUNCIL DIRECTIVE 99/38 EC, 1999/38/EC of 29 April 1999 amending for the second time Directive 90/394/

EEC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens at work and extending it to mutagens, Brussel 1999.

EN ISO 1127-1: 2001 Explosive atmospheres, Brussel 2001.HAUERT, Frank, VOGL, Albrecht (1995). Measurement of Dust Cloud. Characteristics in Industrial Plants. 1.

Final Technical Report, 1995. 1Number: PL 910695, CREDIT - project of the European Commission, p. 54.KARABASIL, Dragan, JAKOVLJEVIĆ, Vladimir (2007). Ekološke intervencij. Visoka tehnička škola strukovnih

studija, Novi Sad. 2007, ISBN 8684853245, 9788684853242. (in Serbian).MDHS 14/3: 2000. General methods for sampling and gravimetric analysis of respirable and inhalable dust MDHS

14/3 (Methods for the Determination of Hazardous Substances), Health and Safety Laboratory HSE.MILANKO, Verica, SIMENDIĆ, Borislav, KOVAČEVIĆ, Ružica (2010). Neophodnost određivanja opasnih

količina pašina u industriji, Zbornik radova; Savetovanje Procena rizika, Kopaonik, 2010, s. 447-455, ISBN 978-86-84853-66-2. (in Croatian).

MRAČKOVÁ, Eva (2006). Confronting the explosion protection problem. In: Ekonomski aspekti zastite radne i zivotne sredine: zbornik radova/XIV Naucni skup"Covek i radna sredina", Nis 2006, p. 125-133, ISBN 86-80261-69-6.

N01-ES-85421 (2000). Wood Dust, RoC Background Document for Wood Dust, 2000, Public Health Service National Toxicology Program U.S., Contract Number N01-ES-85421, p. 9-22.

OČKAJOVÁ, Alena, BELJO, Lučić, Ružica, ČAVLOVIĆ Ankica, TERENOVÁ, Jana (2006). Reduction of dustiness in sawing wood by universal circular saw. Drvna industrija 57 (3), p. 119-126, 2006, ISSN 1847-1153.

ORÉMUSOVÁ, Emília, MAKOVICKÁ OSVALDOVÁ, Linda, OSVALD, Anton (2012): Gross Calorifi c Value of Leaves, Bark and Branches od Selected Deciduous Trees. In: Transactions of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava Safety Engineering Series. VŠB - Technical university of Ostrava 2012, No. 1/2012, Volume VII., ISSN 1801-1764, p. 32-36.

OSHA 3371- 08: 2009. Hazard Communication Guidance for Combustible Dustsar Hazard Communication Guidance for Combustible Dusd Communication Guidance.

PRITCHARD, David (2004). Literature review - explosion hazards associated with nanopowders. A report of the Health and Safety Laboratory of the UK Health and Safety Executive: HSL/2004/12. 2004, s. 17. [cit. 2012-08-02]. Available at: http://www.google.sk/#hl=sk&gs_nf=1&cp=44&gs_id=2&xhr=t&q=xcontrol%5Creports%5C2004%5Cec_04_03%5Cec_04_03.doc&pf=p&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&oq=xcontrol%5Creports%5C2004%5Cec_04_03%5Cec_04_03.doc+&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=38b8ecf18c03d812&biw=1440&bih=776.

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CALCULATION OF LOCAL FIRE FOR DESIGNING BUILDING STRUCTURESJiří POKORNÝ1, Petr KUČERA2

1 Fire brigade of the Moravian-Silesian Region, Ostrava, Czech Republic, [email protected] VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Faculty of Safety Engineering, Ostrava, Czech Republic, [email protected]

Abstract: The issue of designing building structures for the effects of fi re is resolved on the basis of data obtained by standardized values, tests, calculations, or a combination of the described procedures. The calculation methods are becoming more important with certain kinds of building structures, including steel and wood building structures. One way to defi ne the thermal stress of building structures, which is usable especially immediately after the development of a fi re, is the local fi re method. This text summarizes the principles of calculation when using local fi re; it evaluates its positive and negative aspects, and especially its practical applicability.

Keywords: Fire, Building structure, Design, Local fi re.

Research article

IntroductionThe stage of the development of the fi re has long

been of interest to professionals involved in fi re protection, especially specialists in assessing the parameters of building structures. One of the most observed characteristics is their fi re resistance.

Wooden and steel structures "pride themselves on" a range of positive qualities, but in terms of fi re safety they often require the implementation of certain measures that will ultimately increase the fi nal price of the building element or structure. Therefore, the interest in assessing the development of fi re, and consequently the local fi re, is understandable.

Materials and methods

Assessing Building Structures for the Effects of Fire

The requirements for building structures, and therefore also their fi re resistance, are generally established by the Council Directive (89/106/EHS, 2008) on the approximation of laws and regulations of member countries related to construction products as amended by the Council Directive 93/68/EHS (hereinafter referred to as "Council Directive"). The requirements are further specifi ed in the Interpretative Document No. 2 in the Council Directive, which describes the basic requirements and strategies in terms of fi re safety, the philosophy of engineering principles, and forms of meeting the

fi re safety conditions. It also includes an assessment of building structures in terms of their fi re resistance.

The European requirements have been implemented into the Czech legislation. In accordance with Act No. 183/2006 Coll., on planning and building regulations (Building Act), as amended, and Decree No. 268/2009 Coll., on technical requirements for constructions, as amended by Decree No. 20/2012 Coll., the buildings must meet, inter alia, the fi re safety requirements.

Requirements for the method of evaluating the fi re resistance of building structures are further specifi ed by legal and technical regulations. The basic principles of Decree No. 23/2008 Coll., on technical conditions of building fi re protection, as amended by Decree No. 268/2011 Coll. Details are further specifi ed by the code of fi re safety standards (standards of series ČSN 73 08xx) and Eurocodes. The Eurocodes currently contain approximately sixty design documents. In terms of fi re protection Eurocode 1 is the most important: Actions on structures - Part 1 - 2: General actions - Actions on structures exposed to fi re.

The evaluation of fi re resistance of structures is ultimately subject of the fi re safety solution elaborated as a part of the documentation of constructions according to Decree No. 499/2006 Coll., on construction documentation, to the extent stipulated in Decree No. 246/2001 Coll., on establishing the conditions of fi re safety and the state fi re supervision (decree on fi re safety).

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Requirements and Certifi cation of Fire Resistance of Building Structures

The fi re resistance of structures is collectively expressed by the ability of the structures to resist the effects of fi re. The evaluation of fi re resistance consists of certifying compliance with the specifi ed requirements.

Generally, the following exposures are established for thermal stress (89/106/EHS, 2008):• a small source of ignition (e.g. a match),• independently burning objects (e.g., burning

furniture, stored materials in industrial premises),• fully developed fi re (e.g., actual fi re stress,

standard temperature/time curve).

Fire resistance is usually determined for the standard course of the fi re or the likely (parametric) course of the fi re. The standard course of the fi re is in accordance with fi re resistance determined by the calculation fi re stress, or the equivalent fi re duration. The likely course of the fi re is determined by specifi c conditions of the part of the construction or technological object that is under consideration, usually with an aberrant development of temperatures in the burning area from the standard course of the fi re. The likely course of the fi re is determined by the likely duration of the fi re and the likely fi re gas temperatures) (ČSN 73 0804, 2010), or a temperature analysis of the parametric course of the fi re (ČSN EN 1991-1-2, 2004).

The requirements for the fi re resistance of structures in relation to the risk of fi re compartments is determined by the code of fi re safety standards (series ČSN 73 08xx), or by other documents (e.g. by ČSN EN 1991-1-2).

Fire Resistance of Structures (ČSN 73 0810, 2009):• is determined by classifi cation according to

the results of the tests under corresponding test standards (see ČSN EN 13501-1 and ČSN EN 13501-2),

• is determined by the standardized value (according to ČSN 73 0821, a value in accordance with the Eurocodes, or a value specifi ed in extended application), or calculation in cases when all factors affecting the fi re resistance can be numerically formulated,

• it can be determined by a test and calculation in cases when a test cannot cover all the factors affecting the fi re resistance, or when the test results for a specifi c application require further assessment.

Local Fire

Local fi re represents a situation where the total combustion of substances is unlikely, and uneven temperature distribution in the space is presupposed.

In terms of the development and spreading of the fl ames, two basic situations are distinguished (see Fig. 1):• the fl ames are not reaching the ceiling; (Lf < H, the

length of the fl ames is less than the height of the ceiling above the fi re source),

• the fl ames are reaching the ceiling; (Lf ≥ H, the length of the fl ames is equal to or greater than the height of the ceiling above the fi re source). In this case it is necessary to determine the horizontal length of the fl ame Lh, which is demarcating the space of the radial expansion of the fl ames under the ceiling.

Fig. 1 Flames of fi re in a confi ned space (Kučera and Pokorný, 2010)

The input data for assessing the effect of local fi re on building structures are the length of the fl ame Lf, the virtual beginning of the axis z0, the convection of the heat release rate Qc and others1. The methodology for the calculation according to Eurocode 1 is further determined by the temperature increase of the axis Fire Plume2 and the heat fl ux incident on the surface of the structure (for cases where the fl ames do not reach the ceiling) or direct heat fl ux incident on the surface of the structure (for cases where the fl ames reach the ceiling). In principle, the solution procedure may be described by the following dependencies (ČSN EN 1991-1-2, 2004).

1 The symbols in this and the following part of the text are copying the indications in Eurocode 1.

2 The development of the fi re is accompanied by the emergence and development of a column of smoke gases. This is generally referred to as Fire Plume.

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24

Assuming that Lf < H: (1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

whereLf is the length of the fl ame (or the medium height

of the fl ame) [m],H the distance between the fi re source and the

ceiling [m],θ(z) the temperature in the cloud of burning gases

along the symmetric vertical axis [°C],Qc the convective part of the heat release rate Q

[W],z height along the fl ame axis [m],z0 virtual beginning of the axis [m],hnet the net heat fl ux per unit of the surface area

[W.m-2],hnet,c the net heat fl ux per unit of the surface area

under convection [W.m-2],hnet,r the net heat fl ux per unit of the surface area

under radiation [W.m-2],αc coeffi cient of heat transfer under convection

[W.m-2.K-1],θg temperature of gases near the element exposed

to the effects of the fi re [°C],θm surface temperature of the element [°C],φ positional factor [-],εm surface emissivity of the element [-],εf fi re emissivity [-],σ Stefan-Boltzmann constant [W.m-2.K-4],θr the effective temperature of radiation of the

environment of the fi re [°C],h the heat fl ux incident per unit of surface area

abreast with the ceiling exposed to the effects of the fi re [W.m-2],

r the horizontal distance between the vertical axis of the fi re and the point on the ceiling, for which the heat fl ux is calculated [m],

Lh horizontal length of the fl ame [m],z´ vertical position of the virtual heat source [m].

The calculation procedure of local fi re described in Eurocode 1 is one of the usual, and also one of the simplest methods for determining the axial temperature of the Fire Plume and the heat fl ux incident on the building structure. The simplicity of the solution is also the reason for the signifi cant limit to the use of the described method. This is especially the calculation limit due to the vertical position in the space (the position in the Fire Plume) and the effect of the cumulating smoke.

The presented relations can be used to determine the axial temperature of the Fire Plume in its fi nal section, the smoke zone.3 The application of calculation methods in other parts of the Fire Plume leads to unrealistically optimistic results (Kučera and Pokorný, 2010), (Pokorný, 2009).

A computational method is, among other things, based on the assumption that in the developing column of smoke gases there is suction of ambient air at a temperature corresponding to the standard ambient conditions (typically 20 °C). In real situations, however, with fi res in enclosed areas in most cases layers of smoke are created under the ceiling construction, which progressively lowers. When the Fire Plume penetrates the hot layer of gases its axial temperature is affected due to changes in environmental conditions. When the Fire Plume is forming there is a suction of gases, which have a higher temperature than the ambient temperature, and thus a decrease in the temperature with the increasing distance above the surface of fl ammable materials is more gradual. The resulting values of the temperature of the Fire Plume axis with or without taking into account the hot layer of gases may vary signifi cantly, and the results obtained by the procedure according to Eurocode 1 may be misleading in the case of the existence of a hot layer of gas (signifi cantly undersized) (Kučera and Pokorný, 2010).

The limit to the calculation procedure according to Eurocode 1 is shown in Fig. 2. A case study evaluated the area of the hall, where metallic materials are processed and stored. The procedure according to Eurocode 1 determines the axial temperature of the Fire Plume below the roof structure in the 15th minute of fi re of 164 °C. Assuming the same conditions using the zone model CFAST (2011).4 The determined average temperature of the hot smoke layer is 335 °C. „Is it possible for the average temperature of the hot gas layer determined

3 The Fire Plume is divided into the fl ame zone, the transition zone, and the smoke zone (Heskestad, 2008).

4 CFAST is a zone fi re model, which was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

0( , , )cz f Q z z

, , net net c net rh h h

, ( )net c c g mh

44, . . . . 273 273net r m f r mh

( , , , )́hh f H r L z

heat losses of constructionneth h

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25

by the CFAST model to be higher than the axial temperature of the Fire Plume determined by the process according to Eurocode 1?“. No, it isn't. This result is obviously incorrect. The axial temperature of the Fire Plume should be higher than the average temperature of the hog gas layer. This error is caused by the limits of the procedure for assessing local fi re according to Eurocode 1.

Fig. 2 Assessing the average temperature of the gas layer with the CFAST model

ResultsThe procedure for determining the axial

temperature of the Fire Plume (local fi re according to Eurocode 1 may be applied) is shown in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3 The procedure for determining the axial temperature of the Fire Plume (Kučera and Pokorný, 2010)

The theory of the local fi re is usable in the assessment of the ambient temperatures at the time of the required fi re resistance of the structure, in which it is not necessary to set up fi re protection of steel structure, in certain cases during the installation of the automatic fi re extinguishing system or equipment for the outlet of smoke and heat, or without the installation of these device5 (for special applications). Again, however, in most cases it is necessary to take into account the infl uence of the layer of hot gases that accumulate under the ceiling structure.

ConclusionThe methodology of the local fi re according to

Eurocode 1 can only rarely be applied in practice without additional calculation methods for the design of building structures under fi re conditions. These are cases of buildings of large geometric dimensions, where the drop of the smoke layer is considerably slow and the short application time of the calculation methodology (low requirements for the fi re resistance of building structures).

The simplicity of the procedure for the assessment of local fi re according to Eurocode 1 signifi cantly limits its wider application.

AcknowledgmentsThis work was supported by

the project of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic No. VG 20122014074 - “Specifi c Assessment of High Risk Conditions for Fire Safety by Fire Engineering Procedures“.

5 Article 4.8 ČSN 73 0810 (2009).

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References89/106/EHS (1989). Interpretation document of Council Directive 89/106/EHS For construction products,

Essential Requirement No. 2 - Fire Safety. Brussels: EC (European commission) published in series C of the Offi cial Journal of EC No. 94/C 62 (94/C 62/01), 1989.

CFAST (2011). Fire growth and smoke transport Modeling with CFAST. In: NIST, Fire Research Division, CFAST. [online]. 2011 [cit. 2013-02-27]. Available at: <http://www.nist.gov/el/fi re_research/cfast.cfm>.




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ČSN 73 0804 (2010). Fire protection of buildings - Industrial buildings. Prague: ÚNMZ, 2010, 156 p. (in Czech).ČSN EN 1991-1-2 (2004). Eurocode 1: Actions on structures - Part 1-2: General actions - Actions on structures

exposed to fi re. Prague: ÚNMZ, 2004, 56 p. (in Czech).ČSN 73 0810 (2009). Fire Protection of Buildings - General requirements. Prague: ÚNMZ, 2009, 44 p. (in Czech).HESKESTAD, G. (2008). Fire Plumes, Flame Height, and Air Entrainment. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection

Engineering. Fourth Edition, Section Two, Chapter 2-1. Quincy: National Fire Protection Association, 2008, pg. 1-20, ISBN-10: 0-87765-821-8, ISBN-13: 978-0-87765-821-4.

KUČERA, P., POKORNÝ, J. (2010). Determining the thermal stress of building structures under fi re conditions. Ostrava: KONSTRUKCE Media, s.r.o., KONSTRUKCE Professional magazine for construction and engineering (reviewed journal), 9th annual volume, 2010, No. 6, p. 26 - 31, ISSN 1213-8762 (Print), ISSN 1803-8433 (Online), Reg. No. MK ČR E 13563.

POKORNÝ, J. (2009). Principles of thermal analysis of Smoke Plume. In proceedings of XVIII year of the international conference Fire Safety 2009 (reviewed journal). Ostrava: VŠB - TUO, FBI, SPBI a HZS MSK, 2009. p. 457 - 467, ISBN 978-80-7385-067-8.

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PHENOMENA DISTURBING THE EUROPE SECURITY AND TASKS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHDana PROCHÁZKOVÁ1

1 Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Transport Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic, [email protected]

Abstract: Based on the concept that the Europe and its parts are represented by model “System of systems” denoted as the human system the in-depth study of disasters and disasters´ management reveals the tasks for future research. The formulation of tasks for research is based on philosophy that each responsible government should protect the inhabitants daily and at critical situations. The outputs showed that European citizens are very threatened by organisational accidents the causes of which are the human behaviour defects and mainly human management defects on all levels of government.

Keywords: Safety, Security, Disaster, Disaster management, Future research tasks.

Research article

IntroductionSecurity situation in the Europe, world and

in each territory continuously changes with time, and therefore, it is necessary to form new safety culture taking into account the actual knowledge and experiences with interdependences among the public assets leading to extreme social crises (in history e.g. great famines). With regard to the historical development there are: a lot of preventive and mitigation measures that have been applied into practice by legal rules, technical standards and norms and public instructions; response systems; and renovation ways. However, it is true that their effectiveness decreases with time because new risks emerge and territory and human vulnerabilities increase in all domains.

The research comes out of the systematic concept of reality and its aim is systematically to create the Europe as a safe community that has a highly sustainable potential and it stands as a signifi cant world power, i.e. it ensures security of itself and of its vicinity (i.e. in the globalization era of the world) by using the human system management based on strategic, systemic and proactive system of systems management (Procházková, 2011, 2012a, 2013). The concept used is complex so that it enables the solution of most present problems.

The paper summarizes the results of disasters’ research and disasters’ management research in the Europe. On their basis, it identifi es the shortages, forms the tasks for the serious shortages remove and also proposes the directions, which the following research should head to, so that the Europe would systematically create the safe community and build the background for sustainable development.

Present goal of humans is to live at safe space, and therefore the UN formulated the aim of a “safe human system” in 1994 (UN, 1994) and the EU “safe community” in 2004 (EU, 2004). In agreement with the EU and UN proclamations and the professional knowledge there is necessary for conservation and sustainable development of the human society to create the safe territory. With regard to present knowledge we should consider that we want to build safe open dynamically variable system that is a complex system the model of which is the system of systems (SoS), i.e. several overlapping systems (Procházková, 2012b).

The security and development of both, the humans and the human system are disturbed by disasters, i.e. internal or external phenomena that lead or from a certain size can lead to damages, harms and losses on humans and human system assets. It means that human system safety (i.e. set of measures and activities ensuring the security and development of both mentioned objects) must consider both, the processes, actions and phenomena that are under way in human society, environment, planet system, galaxy and other higher systems, and the human management acts. Therefore, for safety reasons we must negotiate with risks of different origin and kind. The research performed under the FOCUS project (EU, 2011) deals with principles of negotiation with risk at stages of its mitigating and managing in selected sections of human system management and it gives tools to the public administration for public affairs governance because it is responsible for territory governance and conditions. Especially, it concentrates to the EU governance.

On the basis of a current knowledge, from a systematic and strategic viewpoint, it is not

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possible to solve signifi cant problems of a complex system, which is every area, i.e. also the Europe by reducing complex problems to a set of simple problems and by neglecting the non-linearity’s and various interdependencies that create the specifi c couplings, which are the causes of risks across systems, among partial systems, between the system and its vicinity etc.

The current knowledge shows that it is necessary to deal with the problems on the basis of the systematic concept of reality, which is in case of our research the human system. Systematic concept is based on the systemic (holistic) thinking, the typical feature of which is the focusing on the whole views at systems and on research of relations among their individual parts. The characteristics of a systematic thinking are: to see both, the whole and the details at the same time; to focus on the dynamics of processes; to pay attention to relations, associations and interactions; to take into account the roles of a feedback; to consider the relativity of possible situations; and to think in a long-term way. A system according to its core means more than only a sum of parts, and therefore, the stress is put on: study of the interactions and associations; non-linear thinking; interactions; inductions; feedbacks; and experiments or realistic simulations. E.g. feedbacks cause non-linearity’s in the system behaviour that is not predictable, and therefore, it is not possible to use the common prognostic methods for the identifi cation of the possible states of a system.

For the characteristic and management of simply organized units, the results of analytic solutions are used. For the characteristic and management of composite systems (in practice the term construction is used) that are understood as a representation of elements that are organized and connected in a certain way and because of a proper structure they fulfi l certain functions, there are used results of statistical solutions based on analytic functions, the parameters of which are variable in a certain interval, which is a refl ection of various possible states/variants of the system behaviour. For the characteristic and management of complex systems, the results of simulations must be used since the given aggregates have many components (often systems too) those interact together and are organized in several levels, which causes that we observe: suddenly emerged behaviour features that is not possible to obtain from the knowledge of components’ behaviour, it is the so-called emergence; hierarchy; self-organization; and various management structures, which all together seems as a chaos. Therefore, while observing it is necessary to take a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach. For their management it

is then necessary to use the multi-criteria approaches, the model of the system of systems and also to consider the cross-sectional risks (Procházková, 2012b). For the solution of their problems the tools based on the theory of chaos (Ott, 2012), theory of fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1975), complexity theory (Gleick, 1996, Lucas, 2006, Mayers, 2009), theory of possibilities (Dempster 1967, Shafer, 1976) exist. Since the Europe belongs among the developed parts of the world and the EU has ambitions to be the world power, it is necessary for it to build its politics on the current knowledge.

Materials and methodsThe systematic research of disasters the summary

of which based on more than 5 000 professional works, historical catalogues, databases, archives is in works (Procházková, 2011, 2013) revealed that we must consider the following disaster types as being the results of processes:• in and out of the Earth: natural disasters

(earthquake, fl oods, drought, strong wind, volcanic activity, land slide, rock slide etc.); land erosion; desertifi cation; fundament liquefaction; sea fl oor spreading etc.,

• in the environment including human body, animals and plants; and in the human society separated to: - unintentional: illnesses; epidemic; epiphyte;

epizootic; involuntary human errors etc.,- intentional: mutual improper behaviour of an

individual or groups of individuals: wrongful appropriation of property; killing a human; bullying; religious and other intolerance; criminal acts such as: vandalism and illegal business, robbery and attacking, illegal entry, unauthorized use of property or services, theft and fraud, intimidation and blackmail, sabotage and destruction, terror against individuals, terrorist attacks; local and other armed confl icts; intentional disuse of technologies, such as: improper application of CBRNE substances; data mining from social networks and other cyber networks used for psychological pressure on a human individual; incorrect governance of public affairs: corruption; abuse of authority; and the disintegration of human society into intolerant communities,

• connected with human activities: incidents; near miss; accidents; infrastructure failures; technology failures; loss of utilities etc.,

• that are reactions of the Planet or environment to human activities: man-made earthquakes; disruption of the ozone level/layer; greenhouse effect; fast

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climate variations; contaminations of air, water, soil and rock; desertifi cation caused by human bad river regulation; drop of the diversity of fl ora and fauna (animal and vegetal) variety; fast human population explosion; migration of great human groups; fast drawing off the renewable sources; erosion of soil and rock; land uniformity etc.,

• connected with inside dependences in human system and its surrounding separated to: - natural: stress and movements of territorial

plates; water circulation in environment; substance circulation in environment; human food chain; planet processes; interactions of solar and galactic processes,

- human established: human society management; fl ows of raw materials and products; fl ows of energies; fl ows of information; fl ows of fi nances etc.

In social domain for reasons of internal relations the monitored adverse effects are put together to the following groups: subsequent crime and other offences. The group includes: vandalism and illegal risk behaviour, robbery raids and attacks, property crime, killing and rioting; tax fraud and fraud. The group includes: tax fraud, fraud; damage to the customs laws, including: customs fraud, smuggling of prohibited goods; illegal access to any information systems. The group includes: data theft or data changes, espionage, partly fraud - forgery of documents, partially terrorist attack, data mining from social networks leading to the psychological pressure on people; corruption and serious economic crime, including money laundering, extortion and humiliation. The group includes: corruption, abuse of authority, society disintegration into the intolerant groups. The group includes: religious and other intolerances.

Due to lack of data there are not considered: child labour, sabotages, infringement of law by government agencies, maritime piracy, severe negligence with criminal responsibility, misuse of postal services, an anonymous notice of alarming information, environmental crime including pollution, and violations of security regulations.

For investigation of disasters, types of disasters´ management there were used original data and results of special projects, e.g. Switzerland - the PLANAT project, US - FEMA projects, Canada, the Netherlands, EMA (Australia), OCHA, the Czech Republic, IAEA, OECD, UN etc. - real references are in (Procházková, 2011, 2013) and in materials quoted in. For obtaining the original results there were also used: historical catalogues, databases, archives and original papers on phenomena that

caused harms and losses on public assets in time period from historical time up to now, i.e. they belong to disasters; for some of them (fl oods, earthquakes, chemical accidents, epizootic, epidemic, electro-energy net failure) the results obtained are very detailed; and the different methods, from very simple method to scientifi c ones.

The outputs described in the next paragraphs were created by the pure scientifi c methods, i.e. analysis and synthesis of obtained published results on disasters; specifi c investigation of disasters by analytical and heuristic methods. Heuristic methods were in the fi rst tested on real data if they are suitable for security tasks solution; specifi c investigation of level of disaster management by help of special questionnaire; and specifi c investigation for identifi cation of critical items in territory management from the viewpoint human survival performed by special logical tool specially tailored for the FOCUS targets (Procházková, 2012c).

Detail descriptions of data and methods with references are in publications quoted in appropriate places.

ResultsThe detailed study on disasters and disaster

management in the EU (Procházková, 2013) was concentrated to ten domains the outputs of which are concisely summarized in work (Procházková, 2013). This work also obtains results of theoretical study dealing with the form of EU security concept: it must be based on the systemic (holistic) thinking, the typical feature of which is the focusing on the whole views at systems and on research of relations among their individual parts; proactive approach; all hazard approach (FEMA, 1996); respecting the co-existence of overlapping systems (Procházková, 2012b). For its realisation there is necessary sophistically managing the disasters that damaged the security of community and its assets, i.e. to apply measures and activities of prevention, preparedness, response and renovation. For practical purposes there are necessary good technical solutions based on recent fi ndings and experiences and correctly aimed governance of public affairs supported by legislative with suffi cient legal force, fi nances, qualifi ed human personnel and material base.

Synthesis of results obtained by detailed studies of disasters and disasters´ management described in (Procházková, 2013) is summarized in Tab. 1.

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Tab. 1 Defi cits at disasters´ management from the viewpoint of safe community concept

SECURITY ITEMS RESEARCH RESULTS

Security challenges that can be considered to have big impact in the 2035 time frame and currently are not suffi ciently addressed in the planning of research

The list of followed disasters is necessary to supplement by: - natural: geomagnetic storms; desertifi cation; land erosion; soil salinization; fall of a cosmic body; sand storms;

ocean spreading; and sudden change of weather (cold wave or heat wave), - technological: organising accidents in technological facilities; biotechnologies because their use is not regulated

despite the fact that their wastes are often more aggressive than chemical technologies; disuse of technologies (nuclear, nano and IT); disuse of genetic engineering; and disuse (abuse) CBRNE agents,

- imperfect human activities: education infrastructure breakdown, research infrastructure breakdown, breakdowns (organising accidents) in public governance, defects of supply chains,

- environmental (including human body): stress and movements of territorial plates; rapid natural subsidence of surface; water circulation in environment; substance circulation in environment; human food chain; planet processes; interactions of solar and galactic processes, incurable diseases in systems of humans, animals and plants,

- environment reactions to human activities: artifi cial surface subsidence due to undermining; and interaction due to militarization of outer space,

- social: illegal production and distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances, illegal migration, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.

Most severe security challenges that should be addressed by research planning in the 2035 time frame

The disaster order with regard to the impact severity is: - natural: fall of a big cosmic body on Europe; earthquake; fl oods; forest fi res; and drought, - technological: beyond design accident with presence of radioactive substances; beyond design accident with

presence of substances mutagenic, carcinogenic and harmful to reproduction, - imperfect human activities: corruption, disuse of power, insuffi cient respect to public interest, education

infrastructure breakdown, research infrastructure breakdown, breakdowns (organising accidents) in public governance, defects of supply chains, blackouts, low robust technical and fi nance infrastructure - long-term outage of electrical infrastructure; long-term stoppage of drinking water supply; long- term fi nance market disorder; and long-term shortage of basic food,

- environmental (including human body): disruption of water circulation in environment; disruption of substance circulation in environment; huge pandemics and epidemics and incurable diseases in systems of humans, animals or plants and across them,

- environment reactions to human activities: contamination of air, water, soil and rock missive’s; uncontrolled human population explosion; migration of large groups of people; the militarization of space; and climate variations,

- social: abuse of power; corruption; decay of human society into intolerant groups; abuse of technology; and abuse of authority, illegal access to information systems, cybercrime, terrorist attacks, corruption in government and public administration, including the political scene, serious economic crime, including money laundering, tax evasion, traffi cking with human beings and illegal migration, illegal production and distribution of psychotropic substances, extremism, all forms, discrimination and intolerance.

Challenges for future security research for prevention, preparedness, response and renovation

- To implement the system of management based on integral safety and to improve the prevention, preparedness, response and renovation.

- To build the systematic approach for the response to disasters. Note: the individual Member States have the systems of response on various levels.

- Especially to improve the response to critical situations because extreme disasters cause of big economic and social impacts (lesson learned from Fukushima accident). They affect infrastructure (buildings, transport, energy and water supports), which represents a specifi c threat for the densely inhabited areas.

- To target crisis management for case of extreme situations is necessary. - To process norms and standards for infrastructures that will: ensure their suffi cient capacities; enhance their

robustness and resiliency. - To upgrade sector and cross-sector management - cross-sectional risks (systemic) management and putting the

cross-sectional risks (systemic) under control. - To compile robust measures to prevent disuse of technologies. - To introduce early warning systems in case of disasters for which there are known symptoms that enabling the

warning. - To prepare tools for systematic regulation of recovery process; i.e. a recovery plan and plan for prevention of

losses at renovation. - To improve humanitarian assistance in case of extreme disasters. - To implement systematic use of disaster insurance policies. - To improve attention to land degradation - lack of European legislation and objectives of soil protection. - To improve the EU preparedness for climate change because it is lagging behind in the sphere of adaptation

(in contrast to the absurd emphasis on the causes of the greenhouse effect); to increase attention to adaptation in cross-border dimension (e.g. the possibility of international coordination and construction of dams and reservoirs) - attention to economic and social criteria.




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- To upgrade management of social disasters - Prevention is not systematically carried out for any of the social disasters; prevention is often declared by signed treaties, conventions, treaties or bilateral/multilateral agreements but in reality no effective tools. It is necessary to improve: close interdisciplinary cooperation of all parties involved at national level and consistency with other central institutions within the EU states; and sharing good practice, continuing education and training of experts responsible at the pan-European level. Preparedness for coping with the given disasters is the most well established the best on a theoretical level but the level of practice is greatly affected by the economic stability of a particular Member State; and level detection (intelligence services, technical means, and the level of experts ...) is variable and not interconnected. Because highly unacceptable impact on the current situation in EU countries they have long-term consequences of an economic crisis, it is necessary to fi nd effective tool for inhabitants survive and for stabilization of economic situation that evocates a lot of followed disasters.

- To upgrade process management - type “just in time” is not suitable for goods, measures and activities that are important for human survival.

Related main vulnerabilities to be addressed for future security research

- The most infrastructure and the objects is only protected to the size of design disaster, i.e. at extreme disaster’s sizes they fail, which represents a specifi c threat for the densely inhabited areas. The situation can be made worse by rising of the sea level.

- The insuffi cient level of civil protection at critical situations from the public administration of states. - The low support human daily needs from the public administration of states. - The incapability of inhabitants to take care of himself/herself and his/her family, to secure his/her property, to

have basic food and water for at least 24 hours; incorrect behaviour of humans in critical situations. - Strategic and long-term approach is not systematically included into the territorial planning on both the continents

and coastal areas including transport, regional development, industry, tourism and energetic politics. - Low attention to land degradation - lack of European legislation and objectives of soil protection. - No suffi cient the EU preparedness for climate change, because it is lagging behind in the sphere of adaptation

(in contrast to the absurd emphasis on the causes of the greenhouse effect). - Lack of knowledge stress and movements of territorial plates; rapid natural subsidence of surface; water circulation

in environment; substance circulation in environment; human food chain; planet processes; interactions of solar and galactic processes.

- Low attention to adaptation in cross-border dimension (e.g. the possibility of international coordination and construction of dams and reservoirs) - attention to economic and social criteria.

- The knowledge on the vulnerability of protected assets is only fragmental. - No targeted crisis management for critical situations that can be caused by: beyond design nuclear accident;

long-term outage of electric energy supply; long-term stoppage of drinking water supply; long-term shortage of food supply; long-term failure of the fi nancial infrastructure; and long-term failure of the fi nancial infrastructure.

- The defi ciency of early warning systems in case of disasters for which there are known symptoms that enabling the warning.

- Lack of technical resources, inadequate knowledge and training of managerial staff, poor response management and lack of fi nances.

- Lack of supply chain organisation at emergency and critical conditions. - In many cases not enough care is given to prevent human errors in processing plants and public affairs governance.

Related main knowledge gaps to be addressed for future security research

- Systematic collection of data on disasters of all types and their impacts. - No in-depth research based on data - key step - Missing data catalogues for these disasters; qualifi ed monitoring,

systematic detection system; systematic research etc. Special attention must be paid to social disasters because data for research are pure - collection and processing of data are on low level from methodical viewpoint - it is necessary to create: consistent data sets; effective mutual consultation and co-ordination of procedures and their fl exible adaptation to the rapidly evolving global (trans national) conditions that bring new threat scenarios, and therefore, they require new more reliable methods determining new reliable scenarios.

- Missing knowledge on solution of lack of drinking water, raw materials, resources, energy, food in case of uncontrolled human population explosion and migration of large groups of people.

- Missing tools for robust crisis management in case of extreme disasters. - No verifi cation of every result, before its implementing in practice by a public management opponent and by real

experts who demonstrate professionalism, objectivity and support of public interests - the way how to avoid the infl uence of lobbyists.

- No specifi cation of methods for defi ning the scenarios for the identifi cation, analysis, assessment, management of risks and dealing with risks are defi ned; no standards guaranteeing that the results of methods are comparable.

- No data and methods for investigation of interdependences, rules of co-existence of overlapping systems and of management and trade-off with cross-sectional risks.

Proposed type of future security research

- Monitoring of all kinds of disasters and their impacts. - How to implement in practice the strategic management of integral safety that is systematic and proactive and it

is not infl uenced by lobbyists and other insisting groups. - How to implement the strategic territory safety management in dynamic variable world in which will be taken

into account aspects connected with:• human lives and health as protection of physical body, food, drinking, comfort, homeland,• human security as protection against psychological harm and loss of security,

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• property as protection in case of: buildings and fi ttings - loss, damage; domestic animals - death loss, loss,• public welfare as protection against: deterioration in the atmosphere among the humans; and the loss of security,• environment as protection of: air; surface water; ground water; soil; rocks; landscape; forest; fl ora; and fauna,• infrastructures and technologies as protection in case of: the failure of energy supply (electricity, heat, gas);

failure of water supply drinking, failure of water supply utility; sewage system failure; failure of the transport network; failure of cyber infrastructure (communication and information networks); the failure of the banking and fi nancial sector; failure of emergency services (police, fi re-fi ghters, paramedics); failure of essential services in the area (food supply, waste disposal, social services, funeral services), industry, agriculture; and failure of state and local governments, i.e. of area management and management of human society. To compile principles of continuity plans and contingency plans.

- How to arrange stability of fi nance and bank sectors in the dynamically variable words. - How to implement professional knowledge for the benefi t of the public interest. - How to prevent big impacts of the brain drain and the exodus of professionals; i.e. how to create experience

databases. - How to upgrade cooperation in the security research; the implementation of existing directives and legislation;

and strengthening the individual response tools of the EU to appurtenant disasters. - How to establish effective tools and legislation in prevention, preparedness, response and renovation - e.g. of

Incorrect governance of public affairs also sanctions; qualifi ed research based on real qualifi ed data; and education. - Collection of qualifi ed data (monitoring, qualifi ed catalogues), selection of processing data methods and creation

of standards and norms that will be codifi ed in legislative. - Qualifi ed research of disasters targeted to human security and improvement of population education. - With regard to the lessons from Fukushima to improve the methods associated with the determination of terms

of references for design, construction and operation of technological buildings, equipment’s and infrastructures; deterministic and stochastic approaches must be supplemented by expert judgement that considered infl uence of epistemic uncertainties.

- To improve: system of management of territory and objects; and integral risk management because procedures applied so far do not consider cross-cutting risks, which are the cause of cascading failures of complex systems.

- To operate systematic disaster’s monitoring; to create legislation for prevention, preparedness, response and renovation with special attention to response to critical situations (crisis management, warning systems etc.).

- To study disaster characteristics in-depth; to improve the population education with aim to reduce its vulnerability to these disasters.

- To propose and implement sanctions for contamination of air, water, soil and rock mass. - To propose contingency plan for erosion of soil and rock massifs. - To fi nd the safeguard procedures for landscape uniformity. - To apply Effective protective measures and activities of supply chains.

Expected most needed topics of future security research

- To implement into practice the strategic management of integral safety that is systematic and proactive and it is not infl uenced by lobbyists and other insisting groups.

- To implement professional knowledge for the benefi t of the public interest. - To specify the cases in which system “JUST IN TIME” is impossible to use from the viewpoint of human survival. - To fi nd the way for: reduction of big impacts of the brain drain and the exodus of professionals - creation of

experience databases; elimination of reasons for migration, such as poverty, climate change and hunger; establishment of comprehensive migration policy - e.g. measures and activities for case of sharp climate change, deforestation, desertifi cation, biodiversity loss etc.

- Proposal of human countermeasures against disasters and their impacts, if possible.

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From Tab. 1 analysis it follows that many critical situations in human system is connected with the disasters´ management of disasters for which the humans are responsible - behaviour of humans; human factor; and disturbances in human society behaviour. Generally it is possible to say that the cause of critical situations are organisational accidents that are connected with a human factor; especially with phenomena as corruption; abuse of power; suppress of the public interest; low respect to knowledge and engineering experiences; and low professional level

of management. Their consequences are: government default; technologies failures; infrastructure failures; research failure; social system failure; decay of human society into intolerant groups; increasing number of impoverished people - seniors, dossiers, jobless - problem young people who are out of work and without education; disturbances of daily civil protection human needs; disturbance of daily civil protection, human security and public welfare; disuse of technology, space militarization; real data are in Tab. 2.




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Domain Defects leading to critical situations

Top governance

The domain management: is predetermined to political and military aspects; is short of human dimension and gives low support to the EU inhabitants; does not governed on the basis of qualifi ed data processed by qualifi ed methods; is often determined by fi xed ideas without real assessment of their realisation; is based on image that all is stationary and it does not respect dynamic development of world that means to prepare possible extreme scenarios and measures for human’s survival; and is not realised on the principle “Safety management system for system of systems”.

Technical domain

In domain: no standards and norms for underground and high-rise buildings with regard to human security and public welfare; missing essential services provided to the citizens; scenarios for decision-making are prepared only by simulation without verifi cation with use of real data - sometimes scenarios used were derived for different conditions, i.e. conditions of technology transfer were not fulfi lled; no norms and standards for interoperability; no standards and norms for co-operation of diverse systems; no co-ordinated emergency plans on all levels (EU-wide to regional) - all must be on professional level respecting knowledge and experiences, continuity and contingency plans.

Organisational domain

In domain: missing the effort directed to reduction of weakness (low number of resources, contamination of environment, work price, unemployment) and to use of strength (qualifi ed technician population); no effective tool against to corruption, power disuse, lobbying etc.; missing the support of co-operation on mutual partner principle; missing base for mutual understanding and mutual co-existence; no effective international teams of fi rst responders; no base for close co-operation of fi rst responders; no norms and standards for interoperability.

Knowledge domain

In knowledge base used for decision-making: missing systematic respect to present world nature - dynamic open system of systems; low effort directed to collection of qualifi ed data on disasters and on lesson learned from responses to extreme disasters; underestimation of disasters at disasters´ management; neglecting the creeping disasters as ground water stores, contamination of human food chain etc.; no qualifi ed disasters´ scenarios for decision making.

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Tab. 2 Phenomena that cause the disturbance of social relations, public welfare and human security

Proposal of problems´ solving consists in the fi nding the way how to implement: systematic use of knowledge and experiences at decision-making; strategic safety management and strategic safety engineering based on the system of system approach and on principles integral safety based on integral risk management and trade-off with aim to avert the organisational accidents; human dimension into governance (daily public protection and public protection at normal, abnormal and critical situations); rules for removing the corruption, lobbying and abuse of power; solidarity principle; responsible co-operation among partners; the good governance based on qualifi ed data and on strategic, systemic and proactive management; systematic inspection by professionals, deputies and by public; legislative supporting the public interests into the state and sector management; solution of possible confl icts by peaceful way; special family politics, ensuring the availableness of further education etc. It is also necessary to fi nd the way how to establish and implement into daily practice the basic EU functions, because the economic base, politic and military bases are not suffi cient for the security of the EU inhabitants and for public welfare. For all these problems solving it is necessary to ensure: systematic building the knowledge base; systematic building material and technical base; qualifi ed engineering procedures; the management based on qualifi ed data; realising the EU governance that supports the EU inhabitants. The most effective seems systematic prevention of organisational

accidents that lead to the government defaults on all levels. It is necessary to stop talking and to work with goal “security and sustainable development of humans”.

ConclusionFormulation of tasks for research is based on

philosophy that each responsible government must protect inhabitants daily and at critical situations, i.e. the EU must also preserve the basic functions of a state; the real tasks are given for each public protected asset separately (Procházková, 2013). The basic requirement is so that the research: was targeted, i.e. the already-known was not researched without a good reason; sought and solved open problems, namely correctly with regard to current knowledge and experiences on ensuring the safe community and its sustainable development; demanded objective results under given conditions, i.e. to systematically present the results in front of a relevant expert community and to make them be a subject to a public opponent control. With this, plagiarism can be avoided, the real protection of intellectual property will be ensured and the development of creative abilities of individuals that has a creative potential and that are willing to give it in favour of the EU and its inhabitants’ development will be supported; and would not distort the results - the style “the fundamental is what an authority says” holds development back. Therefore, it is necessary not to dissimulate confl icts among outcomes of




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projects since their existence is normal. Under the effort of fi nding the right solution, it is necessary to make it a subject of a thorough investigation with aim to fi nd the causes of problems and to defi ne an optimal solution of them in a given conditions and within the given possibilities. The main task of the future EU security research is to create systems for knowledge-based decisions and effective utilisation of land and nature. Therefore, the EU must remove prejudice in favour of lobbying groups the interest of which is different from public interest.

The main defi ciencies in the EU disaster management are the following items: all hazard approach is not systemically applied; some disasters are underestimated (mainly in social domain); systemic, strategic and proactive management is not always implemented into practice; co-existence of systems with different nature is not followed; gaps in risk management, risk engineering and in trade-off with risks; present research does not determine

priority orientations, its targets are infl uenced by politicians or lobbies; application procedures and orientation of strategies are not regularly verifi ed; reasonable strategy for disaster management is missing; the disaster management does not often respect disaster life cycle; accent to problem solving is missing, still only a lot of discussions on problems; lack of resources; lack of instrument for ensuring the EU fi nance stability; and lack of management supporting the public protection and sustainable development.

AcknowledgmentsThe research was supported by: the Czech

Technical University, Faculty of Transport Science, the European Union - project FOCUS, grant No 261633 and the Ministry of Education, grant No 7E11072.

DOI 10.2478/tvsbses-2013-0005

ReferencesDEMPSTER, Artur. P. (1967). Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping. The Annals of

Mathematical Statistics, 38 (1967), No 5, pp 325-339.EU (2004). Safe Community. PASR projects, Brussels 2004.EU (2011). FOCUS project. Available at: http://www.focusproject.eu.FEMA (1996). Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning. State and Local Guide (SLG) 101.

Washinton: FEMA.GLEICK, James. (1996). Chaos, Origin of New Science. Brno: Ando Publishing, ISBN 80-86047-04-0.LUCAS, Chris (2006). Quantifying Complexity Theory. www.calresco.org/lucas/ quantity. htm.MEYERS, Ronald A. (2009). Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Berlin: Springer 2009, ISBN

978-0-387-75888-6. OTT, Edward. (2012). Chaos in Dynamical Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press ISBN 0-521-01084-5. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Dana (2011). Strategic Management of Safety of Territory and Organisation. Praha: ČVUT,

483p. ISBN 978-80-01-04844-3.PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Dana (2012a): Facts for the EU Security Concept. Transactions of the VŠB - Technical

University of Ostrava, ISSN 1801-1764, on line ISSN 1805-3238. VII, No. 1, 59-64.PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Dana (2012b). Critical Infrastructure Safety. Praha: ČVUT. ISBN 978-80-01-05103-0.

CVUT, Praha, p. 308.PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Dana (2012c). Results of Selected Methods Evaluation. SPEKTRUM, 1, No. 12, pp. 47-51

ISSN 1211-6920, ISSN 1804-1639.PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Dana (2013). Study of Disasters and Disaster Management. ČVUT study in frame of FOCUS

project. Praha: ČVUT, 207p., ISBN 978-80-01-05246-4. SHAFER, Glenn A. (1976). Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 292p.UN (1994). Human development report. New York 1994, Available at: www.un.org.ZADEH, Lotfi A. (1975). The Concept of a Linguistic Variable and its Application to Approximate Reasoning.

Information Science I, II, III. Inf. Sci., No. 8, 199-257, 301-357, No. 9 (1976) 43-80.




35

TESTING OF DETECTION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PASSIVE INFRARED MOTION DETECTORSAndrej VEĽAS1

1 University of Žilina, Faculty of Special Engineering, Department of Security management, Žilina, Slovak Republic, [email protected]

Abstract: The article contains a methodology of testing and experimentally acquired particular values of parameters of passive infrared detectors, which are useful in evaluation of the contemporary new technical systems of objects protection and designing of these systems.Detector parameters are indicated in the producer technical documentation and they have to comply with the standards (norms). Their testing is realized by certifi ed testing laboratories. A testing is realized only on the probationary test sample and the true parameters of the sold detectors may be different from those that are given. This fact is confi rmed by the results of the measurements, which are given in this article. The measured values are useful as baseline data for the tools for evaluation of measures the physical protection objects.

Keywords: Detection, Evaluation, Effi ciency, Passive infrared detector, Security.

Research article

IntroductionThe main requirements for the intruder alarms

systems, whose components are motion detectors as well and thus passive infrared detectors (PIR), are given by the norm EN 50131 Alarm systems. Intrusion and hold-up systems. Conditions of this norm have to be fulfi lling by intrusion and hold-up system components.

This norm is a part of package of EN 50130 norms. This norm package indicates the requirements, which are general applicable for alarm systems (for example Environmental test methods EN 50130-5, or the Electromagnetic compatibility in the case of norm EN 50130-4).

The test conditions of components of Intrusion and hold-up systems are stated in individual parts of the norm EN 50131 and the requirements for passive infrared detectors are given in section 2-2.

Components of Intrusion and hold-up systems have defi ciencies, which can be reviewed and measured by only qualifi ed person. This measurements can be realized in an environment, where they will be installed and used (from that one can’t deduce conclusions for all components), or in the laboratory conditions.

Compulsory tests after generalization for the passive infrared detectors according the norm EN 50131-2-2 are shown in Tab. 1. This table includes the general requirements for speed and posture during testing of motion detectors.

Tab. 1 General requirements for speed and posture of body (EN 50131-2-2, 2012)

Test Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4

Detection at the boundary Required Required Required Required

Velocity [m.s-1] 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0

Posture Upright Upright Upright Upright

Detection within the boundary Required Required Required Required

Velocity [m.s-1] 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1

Posture Upright Upright Upright Upright

Detection at high velocity

Not required Required Required Required

Velocity [m.s-1] - 2.0 2.5 3.0

Posture - Upright Upright Upright

Close-in detection performance Required Required Required Required

Distance [m] 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.5

Velocity [m.s-1] 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2

Posture Upright Upright Crawling Crawling

Intermittent movement detection performance

Not required

Not required Required Required

Velocity [m.s-1] - - Required Required

Posture - - Upright Upright

Signifi cant reduction of detection range

Not required

Not required

Not required Required

Velocity [m.s-1] - - - 1.0

Posture - - - Upright




36

The purpose of the detector tests is fi rst of all to verify the correct operation of the detectors according to the specifi cations given by the producer. All test parameters introduced have to be fulfi lled within the tolerance range of ±10 %, unless otherwise instructed. When carrying out the tests it is necessary to comply with the assembly and operation instructions stated by the producer.

Materials and methodsTesting the detection characteristic of different

types of passive infrared detectors and from different producers was realized at the Department of Security Management FSI ZU in Zilina in the last three years and the tests continue in the present as well. The workplace has equipment and competence to perform these tests according to set of norms EN 50130.

A standard laboratory conditions (prescribed by norm) for the testing of alarm systems must have a standard atmospheric conditions, which are prescribed by EN 50130-5 norm:• temperature (15 - 35 °C),• relative humidity (25 % RH - 75 % RH),• air pressure (86 - 106 kPa).

The environment should be indoor and there shouldn’t be any air fl ow. The size of the space wherein the detectors are tested should by at least 25 % larger than the coverage of the space, which is guaranteed by the producer of the detector (EN 50130-5, 2012).

The standard walk test target (SWT) must be a person with a height of 160 to 185 cm and weight 70 kg ±10 kg. In the norm are given also requirement about clothes of a person.

The physical parameters of the environment in which are detectors measured: standard indoor environment, temperature 17 - 21 °C, humidity 35 - 60 %, light standard conditions 190-220 Lux. Test conditions satisfy the technical standard EN 50131-2-2 Intrusion detectors. Passive infrared detectors.

The detector has to be installed of 2.0 m, if the producers do not indicate different height. The detector must be oriented with a free fi eld of vision for the performed test according specifi cation of producer.

The detector shall be connected to the nominal supply voltage and to the monitoring system, what indicate alarm signals or messages of intrusion. The detector should have 180 seconds to stabilize. If multiple sensitivity modes such as pulse counting

are available, any non-compliant modes shall be identifi ed by the manufacturer. All compliant modes must be tested (EN 50131-2-2, 2008; Křeček, 2006).

Technical equipment:• PIR detectors (standard Fresnel lens) by different

producers - 11 randomly selected pieces from detectors which are available in the market, corresponding to the second grade according to EN 50131,

• wiring material (cables, LED diodes, resistors, clamps),

• assembly and fi xative material (tighten and insulation tapes),

• stabilized power supply HY1503D,• multimeter UT70,• stopwatch, measuring tape, protractors, • other accessories.

The description of the technology of the tested detectors: Passive infrared detectors (PIR - Passive infrared receiver) evaluate the changes of radiation in the infrared range of the spectrum of electromagnetic waves. The detection element - pyroelectric sensor - is able to detect the changes of the radiation impacting to the detector. The PIR detector evaluates the changes only if the body in his visual fi eld is moving. This body must have a different temperature from ambient temperature. Then the connected electronics will make report about changes. These detectors in the terms of the construction are relatively easy and thanks to that also popular.

The optical system in the detectors uses the set of lenses or set of the parabolic mirrors. The lenses are placed in the detectors in order to be pyroelectric sensor directly in the focus of the lenses. From the lens, which are made mainly from plastic material are mainly used the stepped so-called Fresnel lenses.

Connection: The connection of the detectors control panel and its programming is time consuming. Because of that the detectors were according the tests connected by using signal LED, directly to the stabilized power supply. With this method was a delay, caused by evaluation by circuit of the exchange, eliminated. Detectors were powered by a stabilized one-way voltage. The change of the state was visual count down from LED diodes connected and switched by the contacts of the NC (Normally Closed) detector.




37

The drawing of possible involvement of detector during testing:

Fig. 1 Connection of PIR detectors during tests (where: NC - Normally Closed, GND - ground)

Process: Each detector was stabilized in the test environment before the test started. Before the performing of the individual tests according the norm, was necessary to perform basic detection test to verify the correct functioning of the detector. The basic detection test was performed in this way: SWT moved in a distance of 2 m upright to the axis of the detector at a speed from 0.5 m.s-1 to 1 m.s-1. After each transfer of the detector, change of its settings or after a manipulation from which was detector damage, had to be perform the basic detection test. When the test was succeeding, we could continue with the next test.

Subsequently was performed the testing of the detection characteristics of the selected passive infrared motion detectors, based on the technical documentation which is delivered with the detector. On the fl oor of the supervised premises was marked the detection characteristics - angle, distance and testing points. With the standard detection goal was tested the PIR detector according to EN 50131-2-2 norm. There was realized the tests of the Detection at the boundary, Detection within the boundary, Detection at high velocity, Close-in detection performance, Intermittent movement detection performance, Signifi cant reduction of specifi ed range. For each tests for each experiment was performed the graphic protocols, which consist from the redrawing of detection characteristics of the single detector and from the plotting of the reviewed

detection points. Following is shown the description of each tests according to EN 50131-2-2 Chapter 6 - Walk testing.

ResultsThere were tested 11 different analog and digital

passive infrared motion detectors from different producers during the practical measurements. From each producer were used 3 of their products. All of 11 motion detectors corresponded to the use of objects with low or moderate level of risk - Grade 2 according to EN 50131. There were 5 repetitions of measuring for each detector. Together, 165 measurements have been done, while each measurement consisted 5 subtests. Overall have been performed 825 tests.

Testing the coverage of detection at the boundary

During verifying the detection at the boundary it is necessary to illustrate the test positions of the measurement. Test positions were spaced every two meters along the whole perimeter of the test area boundaries and they had to be spaced from the both sides of the detector.

Each test position was placed on the radial junction with detector and at each test position were shown two test directions with +45° to the radial junction and -45° to the radial junction. Each test point was accessed from a distance of 1.5 meters from it; by walking was tested pass through the test point to a distance 1.5 m over it.

The direction of movement was heading to the inside of detection area. After each individual movement the SWT stayed 20 seconds still. For all of detectors was applied upright movement and movement velocity of 1 m.s-1. The speed of movement was complied by an estimated using metronome and with transfer distance test with value 10 meters for time 10 seconds and then could continue the testing with using similar speed (Mrázik, 2010).

Transfer distance test might be confi rming in all of testing positions and both testing directions. After this fact, it can be said that the detector complied test of detection at the boundary, otherwise it failed. As shown in the fi gure below, not all detectors complied this test and according to the measured results in the majority of tested PIR detector is a noticeable reduction of detection at the boundary covering space.

PIR detector

DCPowerSupply

R

LED

+ GND Tamper NC




38

Fig. 2 Detection test result of one of the detection across the boundary (Mrázik, 2010)

Testing coverage detection within the boundary (inside boundary)

This test is intended to verify detection within the boundary. The measurements were carried out to test positions within the detection characteristics that have to be marked. The fi rst test position was placed 4 m from the detector directly on its axis and marked on the fl oor. Additional test positions were stationed at the intersection of a square grid of size 2 m on either side of the axis of the detector. Square grid was outlined with string and test points were shown on the fl oor. No test point should be located closer than 1 m from the boundary or outside the boundary (Mrázik, 2010).

As in the previous measurement, such in this case the detector has been tested with the movement through test position in two directions to +45° and -45° to the radial line. The movement began 1.5 m before test point and ended 1.5 meters behind it. After each individual movement the SWT stayed 20 seconds still. The speed of movement was dependent on the security level of the detector and it is defi ned in Tab. 1.

Fig. 3 The result of the detection test of one of the detectors within the boundary (Mrázik, 2010)

Transfer test must be suitable for all test positions in both test directions and then we say that detector complied the detection test within the boundary, otherwise it failed (Palica, 2011). 5 motion detectors failed the test, while the coverage of detection at the boundary, where may be considered a distortion of at least 10 %, it is impossible to cover the inside of the detection area with different detector due to a signifi cant reduction in detection.

Testing detection at high velocity

High velocity to perform this test means a velocity of 2.0 m.s-1 and the velocity 3.0 m.s-1. The size of speed depends on the security level of tested detector (Tab. 1). For measurements for the verifi cation of high-speed detection is required to move at velocity of 2.0 m.s-1 to 2.5 m.s-1. Applies to all levels of upright posture. There were done totally 4 tests for each of tested detectors to verify the detection at high velocity (Mrázik, 2010).

The accomplishment of detector in detection test at high velocity is done when alarm signal is generated in all four tests.

Fig. 4 High velocity and intermittent movement (Mrázik, 2010)

By changing the angle of movement indicated speed of 45° to movement vertical to the axis of the detector is probability of overcoming the PIR detector relatively high, reaching values of about 80 % of attempts.

Testing intermittent movement detection performance

For verifi cation of intermittent movement detection were performed two tests, whose were the same as for verifi cation of detection at high speed. To




39

the centre of the detector´s axis was indicated a point and detector has been tested at this point, moving at an angle of +45° and -45° over all detection zones. Movement detection started always away from the detector boundaries towards a detector of velocity 1 m.s-1.

To comply verifi cation of intermittent movement detection, the alarm signal has to be generated in all four tests.

All tested detectors passed the verifi cation, but for detectors with pulse counting circuit can be accessed near the centre of the detection area without activating an alarm.

Close-in detection performance

Tab. 1 defi nes the speed of movement and posture of the body, which is required for this test. It is also depending on the degree of security. For Close-in detection performance at a distance 0.5 m were made two tests passing (bi- directional) desired speed across testing point for each detector.

In order to confi rm, that detector succeed during the test close-in detection performance, has to generate alarm signal during test in both directions. The test highly depends on right location of detector. The overcome of detector by this way is simply and allows to violator access close-in to the detector (Veľas, 2011).

Tab. 2 defi nes about the general results of PIR detection of detectors in individual tests. Tab. 3 contains complex values of detection probabilities of violator according to detector. In consideration of number of measurements we can eliminate mistakes caused by inaccuracy of the measurements.

From the 11 types of PIR motion detectors, which were tested with standard motion Fresnel lens, 9 types of motion detectors (by different producers) didn't satisfy repeatedly at least in one part of the test. Those mistakes were verifi ed by 3 pieces from concrete types of detector.

Tab. 2 Test results of detecting an intruder through transition of the PIR detector characteristic

Although those detectors are used in practise, during the designing of security systems is necessary to count with some deviation of detection characteristics. Also is useful to cover area with more as one motion detectors with overlaps of detection characteristic.

How the standard EN 50131-2-2 specifi ed the possible tolerance in individual tests has to be ±10 %. If the detector didn't pass in at least one of the test by passing, it means that didn't correspond to the standard (Palica, 2011).

The possible existence of uncovered zones in supervised premises can destroy the security of whole system. Just one unsatisfactory element means that whole system (which can be functional) didn't fulfi l requirements of standard for security of property. These requirements are referred by this standard (e.g. policy conditions of insurance companies.

TestUnsatisfactory result

(number of detectors - out of 11)

Detection at the boundary 8Detection within the boundary 5

Detection at high velocity 0Close-in detection performance 4

Intermittent movement detection performance 0

Producer A Producer B Producer C

Detector 1

Detector 2

Detector 3

Detector 4

Detector 5

Detector 6

Detector 7

Detector 8

Detector 9

Detector 10

Detector 11

Detection at the boundary 0.88 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.74 0.77 0.89 0.29

Detection within the boundary 0.98 0.97 0.88 0.94 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.62 0.68 0.91 0.59

Detection at high velocity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Close-in detection performance 0.93 0.73 0.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00

Intermittent movement detection performance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

Tab. 3 Test results of detecting an intruder through transition of the PIR detector characteristic




40

ConclusionAlthough the components declare some

specifi c level of security, during the application in real object a plumber doesn’t know consider whether the conditions, which were written in the technical standard, were achieved that specifi c level. In practice the plumber is not able to verify technical specifi cations which are declared by the producer. For that reason he is following the technical documentation and certifi cates which were added with installed component. He also has to use his practical skills.

The quality control of components should be made by state test organisation (in testing laboratories), that are aimed to electrical safety of checked components and doesn't check the ability of reliability or detection of the components. The tests of reliability and detection abilities are not made to all components of alarm systems. It's not possible to check all components for many reasons (fi nancial, personnel, time etc.). For that reasons just some selected elements (samples) from each production set are tested. Based on the obtained results, testing itself should be necessary made continuously even in case of the products which are recently sold (accidentally or sporadically).

Based on the measurements which were made at Faculty of Special Engineering of University of Zilina were shown that there are the lack of alarm systems in detection ability of the detectors:• the motion detectors don't fulfi ls parameters

and detection characteristics which are written in technical documentation, which is added by producer,

• detectors fulfi ls just the minimum of requirements which were specifi ed in the technical standards. Each change of environment parameters, the size of detection target or the direction, the method and the speed of movement can create the conditions for violation of the supervised premises,

• the detectors are not resistant toward overcome by common available means.

A possible reason for not fulfi l the parameters which were specifi ed in the technical documentation is, that for testing are selected just selected types of concrete products. From production are sold also products which don't fulfi l parameters according to legislations.

In consideration of the results of measurements, it's necessary to take into account characteristic of detector. In the course of projecting security system consider with variance since declared parameters of detection at the boundary of detection space

-20 %. The increase of detection capability is currently possible overlap of detectors detection characteristics.

Based on practical tests can be stated, that during checking the detectors is necessary to spread testing methods about motion detection with speed faster than 3 m.s-1. The direction has to be upright to the axis of the detector and not with angle 45° as was written in standard. Most of the PIR detectors from second and third class could overcome by canter and faster speed in upright direction to the axis of detector without intermittent movement. This situation can happen in objects, where the detectors are situated in areas of long corridors or in rooms without any barriers, which allow reach specifi ed speed.

Standard detection target is specifi ed so narrowly that disregards persons whose weight is less than 70 kg. There is also problem with height of persons. Persons who don't have height between 160 and 185 cm needn’t be detected by motion detector. These assumption about the height and the weight needn't comply young people, women. In this case there could be decrease of the possibility detection. In case that person who disrupted the supervised premises weren't in standard clothes (e.g. have wearing a winter jacket), it can seriously affected the of results detection. The same case can happen when person is coming from colder (outdoor) environment to the protected area.

Nowadays detectors require changes of constructions not just in principles of detection and evaluation of violation. The area of design is also important. Currently is popular miniaturization, but still didn't intervene to alarm systems. The design or the size of intruder alarm systems components didn't change radically in last 20 years. There was also no big change in technologies of detection which are used in common detectors which are available on the market.

AcknowledgmentsThe paper was supported by the Slovak Research

and Development Agency under the contracts: No. APVV 0471-10.




41

ReferencesBROOKS, D. J. (2011) Intruder Alarm Systems: Is the Security Industry Installing and Maintaining Alarm Systems

in Compliance to Australian Standard AS2201? In: Security Journal. Volume: 24, Issue: 2, p. 101-117. ISSN 0955-1662.

KŘEČEK, S. (2006). Příručka zabezpečovací techniky. Blatná: Blatenská tiskárna, 2006. ISBN 80-902938-2-4 (in Czech).

MRÁZIK, P. (2010). Meranie vlastností EZS a ich komparácia s údajmi udávanými výrobcami. Diplomová práca, obhájená 2010, Žilinská univerzita v Žiline, Fakulta špeciálneho inžinierstva, školiteľ: Ing. Andrej Veľas, PhD. (in Slovak).

NOVÁK, L., LUSKOVÁ, M. (2012). Možnosti použitia štatistiky pri skúmaní rizík v priemyselnej oblasti. In: Menadžment 2012: međunarodna naučna konferencija: zbornik radova: Mladenovac, Serbija, 20-21. april 2012. - Mladenovac: Fakultet za poslovno industrijski menadžment; ICIM plus, 2012. ISBN 978-86-84909-74-1. (in Slovak).

PALICA, I. (2011). Meranie vlastností prvkov elektrických zabezpečovacích systémov. Diplomová práca. Fakulta špeciálneho inžinierstva, ŽU v Žiline, 2011. (in Slovak).

PHILLIPS, B. (2001). The Complete Book of Electronic Security. McGraw-Hill Professional, 2001. ISBN 978-0071380188.

ŠČUREK, R., ŠVEC, J., ŠVEC, P. (2011). Využití fyzikálních poznatků v bezpečnostním inženýrství. In: Communications. Žilina: Žilinská univerzita, 2011, s. 114-117. ISSN 1335-4205. (in Czech).

VALOUCH, J. (2012). Integration Techniques Of Alarm Systems. In: TRANSACTIONS of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava. Safety Engineering Series. Vol. 2012, No. 1, p.65-72. ISSN 1801-1764.

VEĽAS, A. (2011). Detektory pracujúce na elektromagnetickom princípe - Skúmanie pasívnych infračervených detektorov. In: Medzinárodní bezpečnostní konference „Bezpečnostní Technologie, Systémy a Management 2011“. Zlín: Univerzita Tomáše Bati ve Zlíne, 2011. Príspevky prošli recenzí. ISBN 978-80-7454-111-7. (in Slovak).

EU s.r.o., 2012. ISSN 1801-1764.EN 50131 (2011). Alarm systems. Intrusion and hold-up systems.EN 50131-2-2 (2008). Intrusion detectors. Passive infrared detectors. EN 50130-5 (2012). Alarm systems. Environmental test methods.EN 50130-4 (2012). Alarm systems. Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard: Immunity

requirements.




42

ANALYSIS OF GROUND TRANSPORT SECURITY OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES IN DEAL WITH EXTRAORDINARY EVENTSMiroslav TOMEK1, Ľuboslava LAŠOVÁ2

1 University of Žilina, Faculty of Special Engineering, Žilina, Slovak Republic, [email protected] Kysucké Nové Mesto, Slovak Republic, [email protected]

Abstract: Article presents an analysis of the transport security ground emergency medical services (hereinafter GEMS) Slovak Republic (hereinafter SR) in dealing with extraodinary events (hereinafter EE). The fi rst part deals with the laws of ambulances GEMS. The following sections analyze the development of primary and secondary interventions and interventions in road accidents. The last part is the draft of the transport security of EE by ambulances of GEMS.

Keywords: Ambulance, Extraordinary events, Health, Security, Transport.

Review article

IntroductionEvery EE solution allows in terms of traffi c

ensuring involves the use of the necessary forces and resources in the right place, at a particular time, in the required amount in the required quality and at a reasonable cost. If in the area of EE are present victims (injured and disabled persons) is the need to deploy and properly coordinated, inter alia, suffi cient forces and means of GEMS. Often EE are road accidents.

Activities and successful operation of GEMS requires legal, organizational, material and technical, personnel, and of course fi nancial security. Requirements for material and technical equipment and personnel of GEMS are directly defi ned in the relevant legislation.

Materials and methodsProviding emergency medical care is governed

by different laws. Already in Constitution of the SR in Article 40 is enshrined as one of the fundamental human rights, the right to health. Due to the need to regulate the rescue, particularly the organization and coordination in dealing with different EE, was adopted the law no. 129/2002 about integrated rescue system in 2002 by National Council (hereafter NC) of SR (Lašová, Tomek, 2009).

Several laws dealing with GEMS were approved in 2004 and to this time have been amended several times. Currently, all emergency medical service (hereinafter EMS) is bound by following applicable laws: • Act of the National Council no. 579/2004 of the

emergency medical service and on amendments to certain laws, which defi nes the EMS provides

emergency health care in the intervention area, which is the whole territory of the Slovak Republic. It includes organization of EMS, obligations of Operation Centre EMS and EMS providers;

• Act of the National Council no. 578/2004 of healthcare providers medical professionals, and professional organizations in the health and amending certain laws, which, in its second part discusses the conditions of operation of EMS;

• Act of the National Council no. 577/2004 of about the range of health care covered by public insurance, and payments for services related to the provision of health care;

• Act of the National Council no. 576/2004 of health care services related to health care and on amendments to certain laws;

• Decree of the Ministry of Health (hereinafter MH) SR of 11 March 2009 no. 10548/2009-OL laying down the details of the emergency medical service as the Ministry of Health Decree no. 14016/2010-OL of 9 July 2010, which among other things deals with material, technical and staffi ng OC EMS, stations GEMS and Helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) and ambulances;

• Ministry of Health Decree of 23 March 2010 no. 11378/2010-OL, which provided offi ce stations of GEMS and HEMS (Lašová, 2010).

Rescue groups GEMS are made of health workers and provide medical assistance in direct contact with the injured. Necessity is their competence to practice, which is governed by:• Decree of the Ministry of Health of the Slovak

Republic no. 366/2005 of the criteria and the way the continuing education of health professionals;




43

• Decree of the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic no. 321/2005 of the scope of practice in some health professions, as amended, which governs the scope of practice of a doctor and a paramedic in EMS;

• Government Regulation no. 296/2010 of competency to perform the medical profession, how to further education of health professionals, system training courses and certifi ed system of work activities.

GEMS ambulance stations and ambulances went from 1992 to the present time signifi cant changes, mainly in the number of stations and their modernization. The most important period of the time can be considered 2004, in which the reform was adopted to ensure the availability of time to provide emergency medical care within 15 minutes. As a result of the reform was the increased number of stations from the original 94 to the 259. Overview of GEMS stations since 1992 with an average population per ambulance is shown in Tab. 1.

Tab. 1 Summary of ground stations, emergency medical services and population changes (Lašová, 2010)

* year of implemented changes.

GEMS activity stations are coordinated by the Regional Operation Centre (hereafter ROC) of EMS. According to the state of a person's life in danger, or the number of injured and disabled, because of the need to provide emergency medical care gives ROC EMS command to one or more ambulance with a doctor or with no doctor.

From a medical point of view, to take up the activities necessary for life saving injured people a very important is the time of arrival of professional medical assistance (Buliková, 2011). The legislation of SR does not set time roll ambulance to EE place instead of receiving the order to exit. In the countries of the European Union (EU) is usually customary time of 15 minutes and some countries have this time embodied in laws or ordinances.

The largest autonomous region in Slovakia is Bánska Bystrica region with number of 46 stations of GEMS. It is also the region, where 15-minute range of ambulance is cecured only to 441 villages from total amount of 516 villages, what is 75 % of villages. According to calculations (taking into account the category of road and achieved an average speed of ambulances) is best secured region Žilina region. Theoretical time to roll out the ambulance stations GEMS, established in Žilina region to all 315 municipalities is fi fteen minutes. Providing emergency medical care is provided in Žilina region through 36 ambulances.

The Fig. 1 shows the development of primary interventions in proportion to the population for the period 2007 - 2011 in the autonomous regions of Slovakia. The statistics of operation centre (hereinafter OC) EMS shows that in 2011 has been carried out along 445 235 primary interventions, representing over 2010 by 0.5 % less than in 2009 and it is about 3.38 % more.

Fig. 1 Development of primary interventions ground emergency medical services between

2007 and 2011 (Lašová, 2012)

Currently is the territory of SR covered by 273 GEMS stations where an average of one ambulance provides emergency health care to 19 878 inhabitants. Recent changes in settlements of GEMS stations in Slovakia (implemented in 2010) provide the theoretical range of ambulances within 15 minutes from the exit of the ambulance from GEMS station up to 93.204 %, which represents 2726 municipalities in Slovakia (Lašová, 2012).

Most interventions in proportion to its population in the last year, 2011, were conducted in the Bratislava region, at least in Nitra. The year 2011 saw an increase in the number of primary interventions compared to 2010 in Banská Bystrica, Prešov, Trenčín and Žilina Region.

According to data from the OC EMS mean the time roll of ambulances in 2011 by the performance of the primary intervention increased from

Year*Number

of stations GEMS

Number of inhabitants in

Slovakia

Average population/1

GEMS1992 72 5 306 539 73 7021993 94 5 324 632 56 6452004 259 5 384 822 20 7902008 264 5 424 925 20 5492010 273 5 426 645 19 878




44

10.4 minutes in 2010 to 11.3 minutes. Ambulances of emergency medical assistance achieved averaged 10.4 minutes (12 % increase) and ambulances of emergency medical help 11.9 minutes (6 % increase). GEMS busiest station in the SR station with emergency medical help was in Michalovce operated by Zachranna sluzba Košice. Provider performed a total of 3 624 primary interventions. Realized in average of 10 trips per day and the average time to roll out its designated location was 11.3 minutes (Lašová, 2012).

The development of secondary interventions is shown in fi gure number 2. The mean duration of secondary intervention in 201 l increased compared with previous years to 145.6 minutes.

Fig. 2 Development of secondary interventions ground emergency medical services between 2007

and 2011 (Lašová, 2012)

Most secondary interventions were implemented in Prešov region (5 247). Most used emergency medical help in SR was an anbulance with sitting village of Stare Hory. Emergency medical help realized 458 secondary interventions in 2011.

According to the statistical indicators is the total number of outpatient interventions across SR steadily increasing. In 2010 GEMS was mainly used at the time of 7:00 am to 3:00 pm. Mentioned time was used as the time for implementation of primary and secondary interventions. High workload intervention group clinics are refl ected in the period from 10:00 pm to 0:00 hours, when it was realized together 34 479 primary and 825 secondary interventions.

The main reason for the increasing number of implemented interventions of GEMS is particularly deteriorating health of an aging population of SR.

Ground ambulance service is also used in road accidents (Buliková, 2011). The statistical overviews of traffi c accidents in SR processed for the years 2007 to 2011 shows decreasing number of accidents. The number of casualties in road accidents, which

are dependent on the rapid provision of emergency medical care, also decreases, but at a slow pace compared to accidents, shown in Tab. 2.

Tab. 2 Overview of traffi c accidents between 2007 and 2011 (Lašová, 2012; Statistics, 2012)

Decrease more than 55 % in traffi c accidents in 2009 is recorded, the reason for the measures in the new law adopted by the National Council no. 8/2009 of on Road Traffi c and on amendments to certain laws. The decline of the victims in 2009 compared to 2008 was 23 %. In 2010, the number of accidents decreased from 2009 by more than 16 % and the number of victims by only 4 %. A signifi cant decrease in the number of traffi c accidents was in 2011 compared to 2010, when it recorded a decrease to 30.57 % accidents and 13.11 % decrease in casualties.

The formation of an accident affecting traffi c fl ow, weather effects, index of industrial production and other factors. A common cause of accidents is human error, particularly inattention, fatigue and failure as a breach of safety rules and breach set vehicle speed (Štetina, 2000).

ResultsRescue groups often intervene GEMS in EE, which

give rise to a large number of victims in one place. Such events include, in particular bus traffi c accidents (2007 in Trenčín, 2009 in the village Polomka etc.), a chain car accidents on the roads in SR.

Special events with large numbers of casualties may occur even in companies that are in the business of working with dangerous substances (for example, 02/03/2007 there was an explosion in the Military Repair business as, Novaky, etc.) or in places where a large number of people (sports and cultural events, check-in hall at airports, railway stations in the cities, schools, etc.). On all these EE's terms of transport need to be addressed with some amenities and emergency preparedness components. It is necessary not only fast in a short time frame to ensure strength and resources of EMS in place of EE, but also to create the conditions to ensure traffi c management intervention (the ability to

YearNumber of traffi c accidents

Development of traffi c

accidents [%]

Number of injuries Development of number of injuries [%]dead severely

injuredlightly injured together

2007 61 071 -1.56 627 2 036 9 274 11 937 5.91

2008 59 008 -3.38 558 1 806 9 234 11 598 -2.84

2009 25 989 -55.96 347 1 408 7 126 8 881 -23.43

2010 21 611 -16.85 345 1 207 6 943 8 495 -4.35

2011 15 001 -30.57 324 1 168 5 889 7 381 -13.11




45

provide communication facilities for staff, adequate supply of medicines, medical supplies, devices, appliances, another necessary transport equipment, etc.) (Smetana, Zdráhal, 2011).

Organization of transport security GEMS in the place of EE can be divided into two phases. In the fi rst phase is expected to implement interventions primarily fi rst and second sequence of vehicles GEMS to the place of EE and in the second phase will be conducted secondary transports.

The fi rst phase of organizing transport security begins upon receipt of an emergency call for COS EMS and ends passing last injured patient to the designated medical facility. Terms of time, it may take from 10 minutes to 12 hours. Transportation security GEMS may be affected, in particular:• feature area of EE (eg, terrain, time of day),• weather conditions, • the number of disabled persons, • mode of transport injured, • the number of clinics that are available,• capacity vehicles for the transport of wounded,

etc.

The second phase of organizing transport security GEMS at EE includes secondary interventions. Some injuries are in need of assistance that will be provided in specialized medical equipment.

Main activity of GEMS that takes place in the fi rst phase will also roll out fast and safe place for EE provision of urgent medical care. The arrival of an ambulance at the place of EE should be provide fi rst aid to injured by bystanders or participants unscathed. Among the activities that are expected to perform in the fi rst phase particularly in terms of transport include:• nearest free ambulance will be sent to EE place by

ROC,• ambulance transfer from GEMS station to the

place of action,• continuous communication with the operator ROC

EMS with fi rst ambulance intervention group,• analysis of the situation in the place of EE by fi rst

intervention group,• profession required number of manpower and

resources GEMS,• provide professional medical assistance in

a limited space EE,• transport the injured to medical facilities, etc.

The fi rst sequence is formed by ambulances that will implement the exit of stations as is described by ROC EMS immediately for quick adoption and

evaluation of emergency. After receiving specifi c information (the number of people affected by EE) from the fi rst point of intervention group in EE, ROC EMS gives the command to exit forces and other resources that make up the second sequence. Their choice to send staff to EE place has to be as fast as possible. In case of good weather, can be use HEMS in the prace of EE. Tab. 3 contains a number of customary numbers of ambulances that would be sent KOS EMS operators to deal with him in case of a large number of casualties in one place.

Tab. 3 Number of ambulances in emergencies

In terms of traffi c will be the needed to take a maximum attention to the parking area for the necessary transport equipment and particularly ambulance, Fire Fighting vehicles, Police vehicles and special equipment. At the parking area for vehicles will be centered ambulances, which will be used to transport wounded. The unit commander will be responsible for removal by using the appropriate urgency ambulance with the necessary equipment and medical personnel, or other means of transport to organize evacuation affected.

As the fi rst patients to be transported from the places EE will be those with red label priority by TRIAGE. For their transport is expected to use an emergency medical assistance ambulance. Transport moderately injured marked in yellow-red card sorting by priority will be done outpatient type emergency medical assistance, if not already available, will be ued ambulances emergency medical help type. Injuries with yellow label priority may be transported to a medical facility by ambulances of emergency medical help type. For removal of easily injured is expected to also use the emergency medical help type ambulance. If suitable climatic conditions for the rapid transport of seriously injured persons can also use HEMS ambulance. For this reason it will be necessary to set the the helipad.

Evacuation route should be provided with a suffi cient number of police offi cers and should ensure passage of the required number of traffi c technique. Location of habitat removal should take into account the simplest smooth arrival and departure of all vehicles.

Number of injuries Number of ambulances in emergencies

3 - 10 3 - 5 11 - 20 5 - 10

21 - 100 10 - 15 nad 100 20 - 25




46

Within the EU, the average number of people per ambulance is less than 25 000. Operation of GEMS stations with two or more outpatient ambulances in some European countries has contributed to a reduction in installation costs associated with the construction of stations. Twelve hour operation of some GEMS stations (eg in Poland) in turn provides lower costs for their individual operation.

In the meantime is not used system rendez-vous in Slovak Republic. This system of emergency medical care, although some benefi ts as a faster arrival physician for a personal vehicle to place of EE and lower number of employed physicians in GEMS, but it also has disadvantages. The main disadvantage is the need of establishing a network of more GEMS stations, which means higher fi nancial costs not only for the establishment, but also the operation of stations.

As mentioned above, the Slovak legislation does not set time roll ambulance to the place where it is necessary to provide urgent medical care, as for example in the Czech Republic (CR) or in Poland. In Germany, each province has its independent act about rescue service where is also strictly determined time standard, such as 12 minutes in Bavaria, Hesse 10 minutes. In London, where the emergency dispatching computer determines that the nearest ambulance arrival at the place of intervention would last more than seven minutes, the paramedic goes to the action by a motorcycle or bike to ensure rapid provision of emergency medical care until the ambulance arrives.

Number of GEMS ambulance stations is connected with time range and their distributions. Of course GEMS distribution channels also depends on the size and population of the area covered by each ambulance.

Ambulance response in SR territory have the entire territory of Slovakia, the Czech Republic is within the scope of their regions in which they are located. The average daily performance of one ambulance in action in SR is 4.7 actions, which is the validity of the use GEMS. In neighboring countries, an average of one such ambulance is performed 3.8 actions in Czech Republic, 3 interventions in Kingdom of Denmark and Sweden and 4 hits a day in UK.

ConclusionThe overall analysis of the current state of GEMS

stations shows observation of the station GEMS be ready 24 hours a day for primary or secondary intervention. According to statistics in the SR primary intervention is carried in average of one in six emergency call of number 155. Exit ambulance to intervene, according to the law no. 579/2004 of must be carried out within one minute of receiving the call from ROC EMS.

In order to manage the provision of emergency medical care to a large number of traffi c casualties in terms of security is very important to put in place of EE the required number of the ambulances with medical personnel as soon as possible. The rapid arrival of ambulances mainly affects the timely availability of EE area. It is therefore necessary that the number of GEMS stations in each autonomous area was reasonable, and must take into account the need for the implementation of secondary interventions. In the performance of secondary interventions rebound to "partially uncovered networks" of GEMS.

AcknowledgmentsThis study/publication was developed with the

support of the Operational Programme Research and Development for the project: Centre of excellence for systems and services of intelligent transport II., ITMS 26220120050 supported by the Research & Development Operational Programme funded by the ERDF.




47

ReferencesBULÍKOVÁ, Táňa at al. (2011). Disaster medicine. Martin: Osveta, 2011. 418 s. ISBN 978-80-8063-361-5.

(in Slovak).JANOŠEC, Jozef. (2010). Fire safety in reality (2010). TRANSACTIONS of the VŠB - Technical University of

Ostrava, Safety Engineering Series. 2010, No. 1, Vol. V, pp. 35 - 44. ISSN 1801-1764. (in Czech).LAŠOVÁ, Ľuboslava. (2010). Development of ground emergency medical services in the Slovak Republic.

In: LOGVD - 2010 Transportation logistics and crisis situations. Zilina: University of Žilina, 2010. pp. 129-132. ISBN 978-80-554-0271-0. (in Slovak).

LAŠOVÁ, Ľuboslava. (2012). The transportation security of emergency medical services during emergency situation. Written project of dissertation exam. Zilina: Faculty of Special Engineering, University of Žilina - Department sciences and informatics. 2012. (in Slovak).

PANÁKOVÁ, Ľuboslava, TOMEK, Miroslav. (2009). Emergency medical servise in emergencies. In: LOGVD Transportation logistics and crisis situations. Zilina: University of Žilina, 2009. pp. 233-239. ISBN 978-80-554-0114-0. (in Slovak).

SMETANA, Marek, ZDRÁHAL, Karel. (2011). Selected problems of terminology used in the context of crisis management within the legal framework of the Czech Republic. Transactions of the VSB - Technical University of Ostrava, Series Safety Engineering. Ostrava, 2011, roč. 6, č. 1, s. 23-26. ISSN 1801-17694. (in Czech).

Statistics on traffi c accidents. 2012.[online]. Ministerstvo vnútra SR [cit. 2012-01-20]. Available at: <http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/dopravna_policia/statistika _dn/Prehladl_DN.pdf>. (in Slovak).

ŠTETINA, Jaromír, at al. (2000). Disaster medicine and mass disasters. Praha: Grada Publishing, spol. s.r.o. 2000. 436 p. ISBN 80-7169-688-9. (in Czech).

Scope of the Journal

Transactions of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Safety Engineering Series, is a printed publication of the Faculty of Safety Engineering issued on a long-term basis. The Transactions provides a space for publishing original research articles especially in the following areas:• fi re protection,• civil protection,• crisis management,• safety and security management,• safety and security planning,• risk management,• environmental safety.

In the Transactions, research articles and review articles are published preferentially. However, vision papers and short communications, such as reports on results of grant projects being dealt with, reviews on books, information on forthcoming conferences, and others can also be published. The journal is published twice a year; editorial deadlines are March 31 and September 30.Transactions of the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava, Safety Engineering Series fi gures on the list of reviewed non-impact factor journals (periodicals) issued in the Czech Republic.

TRANSACTIONSof the VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava

Reviewed journal

Safety Engineering Series, Vol. 8 - 2013

© Published by: VŠB - Technical University of Ostrava

Printed by:Tribun EU, s.r.o.

Cejl 892/32602 00 Brno, Czech Republic

Publication No. 1 - 2013 / FBI

Number of copies: 150 pieces

Editor-in-Chiefprof. Pavel Poledňák

First editionIndividual authors are responsible for the content of articles

Sborník vědeckých pracíVysoké školy báňské - Technické univerzity Ostrava

Recenzované periodikum

Řada bezpečnostní inženýrství, roč. 8 - 2013

© Vydala Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava

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Publikace č. 1 - 2013 / FBI

Náklad: 150 ks

Šéfredaktor:prof. Ing. Pavel Poledňák, PhD.

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