Dr. Russell KirksceyBlanco High School

Texas Tech University

University Interscholastic League Student Activities Conference

Fall 2016

�created a “deluge of materials from the fields of psychology, philosophy, social theory, history, literature, law and jurisprudence, nursing, professional ethics, therapy and counseling, and pedagogy” among others (Larrabee, 1993, p. 5).

�a “conception of morality…concerned with the activity of care [that] centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility of relationships…” (1982, p. 19)

�“relationships, and particularly issues of dependency, are experienced differently by women and men” (1982, p. 8)

� Gilligan (1982) argues that the Kohlberg moral framework was based on patriarchal assumptions.

� Women become “stuck” in Kohlberg’s third stage: “morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others…” (p. 18) and cannot move…

� “toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice (stages five and six)” (p. 18)

�29 pregnant women who were considering abortions

�women approached this ethical question in terms of human relationships• not individual vs. society• not deontological• not utilitarian

� Self: “an initial focus on caring for the self in order to ensure survival”

� Other: “good is equated with caring for others,” while dwelling “on the dynamics of relationships”

� Informed Decision: “dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility” and allows for a more complete moral decision (1982, p. 73-74).

�Auerbach, Smith, and Williams (1985)

• does not clarify the relationship between an ethics of care and “social subordination”

• women using the ethics of care will subordinate themselves to the persons for whom they are caring, thus furthering oppression (p. 154)

�Romain (1992)

• Gilligan does not situate herself within a single discipline but rather moves freely between psychology and philosophy without establishing enough explicit links between the two

� Calhoun (1988):

� “In emphasizing moral interdependency over moral autonomy, the ethics of care provides the kind of theoretical focus that could make moral education and the social determinants of moral knowledge salient” (p. 458)

� humans cannot avoid gender bias in moral frameworks

� acknowledge gender bias and use the ethics of care to balance traditional deonotological, rights-based moral theories

� Kerber (1993):

• the ethics of care is “feminist self-righteousness” (p. 105)

• advocates a kind of separatism that emphasizes women’s spheres in a way that could actually harm the feminist movement for equality

� Sichel (1985):

• “it is unacceptable to divide morality on the basis of gender” (p. 149).

�(1986) “…[M]y critics take the ideas of self and morality for granted as these ideas have been defined in the patriarchal or male dominated tradition. I call these concepts in question by giving examples of women who constitute these ideas differently and hence tell a different story about human experience.”

�Friedman (1993) • neither justice nor the ethics of

care are sufficient alone and that much “overlap” occurs

• the ethics of care is situational while justice is universal

�Calhoun (1988):“Correctly applying moral rules and principles, for instance, requires, rather than excludes, knowledge of contextual details. Both orientations are crucial to correct moral reasoning and an adequate understanding of moral life. Thus, the ethics of justice and the ethics of care are not in fact rivaling, alternative moral theories. The so-called ethics of care merely makes focal issues that are already implicitly contained in the ethics of justice.” (p. 452)

�Gilligan (1982) A moral dilemma constructed as a “conflict of rights” effectively becomes an irresolvable “conflict of selfishness” (p. 142)

�ethics of care can move past this irresolvable point

� Baier (1987)

• a state of nature assumes relationship before the individual

� Groenhout (2004)

• considers several theorists, including Levinas and St. Augustine, to conclude that care takes an original position among humans

� Levinas (1998)

• we are relational beings

• Relations are physical relationships, because we are embodied beings

• the basic relationship with the other is an ethical one, not a normatively neutral relationship of simple physical proximity (interpersonal versus impersonal)

• the other to whom we have an ethical responsibility demands a relationship if we are to adhere to our ontological being

� Broad descriptions of recent studies:

• Slote—Empathy

• Noddings—Social Welfare

• Tronto—Policy Issues

• Held—Moral Theory

• Clement—Feminist Issues

�Comparative Rhetoric (1998)

• possible universal features of rhetoric

� Confucius (551-479 BCE)

� Socrates (469–399 BCE)

�Two kinds of decision making• Women � focus on other-care and personal relationships

• Men � individualistic, deductive, utilitarian, teleological

�care for the other� the choice of self-sacrifice�emphasis on a particular situation

�decreased focus on normative social structures

�ontological basis of relationships

�Supports the major tenets of care ethics

�Reveals the same stumbling blocks

�Ren (jen)—benevolence

�Li—correct social behavior

�Yi—appropriate action through wisdom

�Mentions ren over 100 times

�Never fully defines it

�“benevolence, love, altruism, kindness, charity, compassion…” (Li, 1994, p. 72).

�Often translated as correct behavior or right action

�Unclear about meaning• Rituals and ceremonial rules?• Behavior in all contexts?

�“Whichever the interpretation, liprovides concrete guidance to actions for a Confucian agent” (Chan, 2000, p. 512).

�knowledge of “appropriate action” (Gier, 2001, p. 281)

�parallels Aristotelian phronesis (wisdom) �Plato: justice is highest goal of humanity�reached only after “wisdom, courage,

temperance” (Li,1994, p. 74).

�Use universal experience to understand particular circumstances

�“…must be central to a contemporary aesthetics of virtue” (p. 289; see also Star, 2002, p. 79).

�Confucius and Aristotle: vilified women (Gier, 2001)

�Tung Chungshu’s (179–104 BCE) yin-yangtheory solidified this stance (Li, 1994)

�Unequal relationship between the caregiver and the person receiving care (Pukka,1994; Crigger, 1997)

�serves as a theoretical check on patriarchy

�Based on the Golden Rule� “is…concerned with reversibility…”�“one will do to others only what one

would be willing to accept oneself if the positions were reversed” (Chan, 2000)

�“Like Confucianism, this ‘relational’ theory of the self emphasizes human relationships in two ways; they are constitutive of both human identity and moral goals” (Herr, 2003).

�“…a person practicing Jen should start from one’s parents and siblings and then extend to other people.” (Li, 1994, p. 79).

� “…he should love his father first and more than the stranger…” (Li, 1994, p. 79).

�Confucianism does not force a choice between family and others

�“It depends on individual circumstances…” (Li, 1994, p. 78).

�Rights of the individual do not disappear under the weight of the society

�Theoretical space allows for care ethics scholars to include Confucian theory

�Original texts of Confucius may decrease patriarchal constructs

�May create more universal understanding of care ethics

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� Herr, R. S. (2003). Is Confucianism compatible with care ethics? A critique. Philosophy East and West, 53(4), 471-489.

� Li, C. (1994). The Confucian concept of jen and the feminist ethics of care: A comparative study. Hypatia, 9(1), 70-89.

� Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics & moral education. Berkeley: University of California Press.

� Noddings, N. (1995). Philosophy of education. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

� Star, D. (2002). Do Confucians really care? A defense of the distinctiveness of care ethics: A reply to Chenyang Li. Hypatia, 17(1), 77-106.

� Yuan, L. (2002). Ethics of care and concept of jen: A reply to Chenyang Li. Hypatia, 17(1), 107-129.

� Gilligan, C. (1995). Hearing the difference: Theorizing connection. Hypatia, 10(2), 120-127.

� Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral developmeny: Moral stages and the idea of justice. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

� Lévinas, E. (1998). Entre nous: On thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia University Press.